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Abstract

This report maps current enforcement and compliance measures and practices in Ontario’s
regulation of employment, particularly as they relate to precarious employment. It evaluates the
effectiveness of Ontario’s enforcement regimes, focusing on Employment Standards (ES) and
Occupational Health and Safety (OHS) legislation, and sets these regimes in the context of those
operating in jurisdictions across and outside Canada. Through this process, it identifies and
evaluates potential reforms to improve regulatory effectiveness, particularly for workers in
precarious jobs. The central argument is that there are fundamental deficiencies in both of these
enforcement regimes: each, albeit in different ways, is out of step with the realities of the
contemporary labour market and each demands more proactive approaches to regulation
combined with, where appropriate, innovative reactive and voluntary measures that are
embedded in strong public enforcement.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This report maps current enforcement and compliance measures and practices in
Ontario’s regulation of employment, particularly as they relate to precarious
employment. It evaluates the effectiveness of Ontario’s enforcement regimes, focusing
on Employment Standards (ES) and Occupational Health and Safety (OHS) legislation,
and sets these regimes in the context of those operating in jurisdictions across and
outside Canada. Through this process, it identifies and evaluates potential reforms to
improve regulatory effectiveness, particularly for workers in precarious jobs. The central
argument is that there are fundamental deficiencies in both of these enforcement
regimes: each, albeit in different ways, is out of step with the realities of the
contemporary labour market and each demands more proactive approaches to
regulation combined with, where appropriate, innovative reactive and voluntary
measures that are embedded in strong public enforcement.
While the report focuses on enforcement practices related to ES and OHS
legislation, it is instructive to begin with a brief discussion of both the broader principles
that underpin these pieces of legislation and the general models of enforcement that
aim to implement these principles.
At a normative level, both ES and OHS legislation aim to promote ‘decent work.’
The concept of ‘decent work’ as developed through the International Labour
Organization (ILO) is defined as jobs that provide income and employment security,
equity, and human dignity.2 This aim is articulated in regulations at multiple scales and
at the international level it is the rationale for ILO standards.3 Specifically, the norm of
decent work is rooted in the ILO’s 1998 Declaration on Fundamental Principles and
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Rights At Work and more recent 2008 Declaration on Social Justice for Fair
Globalization. The 1998 Declaration defines these fundamental rights to be: freedom of
association and the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining; the
elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labour; the effective abolition of child
labour; and the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation.4
In 2008, the Declaration on Social Justice for a Fair Globalization built on this
framework committing members to implementing the Decent Work Agenda through four
interconnected objectives: (i) promoting decent work by creating a sustainable
institutional and economic environment; (ii) developing and enhancing measures of
social protection – social security and labour protection – which are sustainable and
adopted to national circumstances; (iii) promoting social dialogue and tripartism; and (iv)
respecting, promoting and realizing the fundamental principles and rights at work.5 The
norm of decent work shapes regional labour standards agreements as well. For
example, in North America this norm informs the labour standards side agreement to
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the North American Agreement on
Labour Cooperation, including its principles on ES, non-discrimination, prevention of,
and compensation for, occupational injuries, and protection of migrant workers.6
In Canada broadly and in Ontario in particular, the pursuit of decent work entails
three normative goals: the promotion of social minima, universality, and fairness.
Social minima refers to “ensuring that workers benefit from minimum acceptable
conditions of employment and … actively promot[ing] the adoption of socially desirable
terms and conditions of employment.”7 This is historically a primary rationale for ES
legislation, which is meant to establish a legislative floor below which conditions of
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employment are not to fall. Such a floor is recognized as necessary to protect against
employer exploitation due to unequal bargaining power between workers and employers
(see goal of fairness below).
The second goal is universality. This objective involves “extend[ing] the
minimum benefits of the legislation to the greatest possible number of employees.”8
While universality is a stated goal of legislated standards, special exemptions and/or
conditions are often built into legislation to exclude particular employee groups from
coverage of some or all standards depending on the circumstances of their
employment.
Finally, the goal of fairness refers to “safeguard[ing] workers against exploitation
and …protect[ing] employers against unfair competition based on lower standards.”9
Underlying the principle of fairness lies the imperative to address the fundamental
power imbalance that exists between employers and employees, particularly those
workers who are without union representation and in the most precarious forms of
employment.
These normative goals contribute to, and are reinforced by, the workplace policy
objectives of assuring basic labour standards, protecting against major down side risks
associated with employment and mitigating against power imbalances and resulting
abuses.10 Such workplace objectives translate into, and are shaped by, both OHS laws
(protections against exposure to unacceptably hazardous working conditions and
provisions for worker involvement in OHS management) and ES laws (standards
governing payment of wages, hours of work and eating periods, overtime pay, minimum
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wage, public holidays, vacation with pay, equal pay for equal work, benefit plans, leaves
of absence, and termination and severance of employment).
Such laws are then enforced through a range of regulatory strategies that differ in
the way they deploy available enforcement tools. In broad terms, there are three
general forms of enforcement: (i) proactive enforcement; (ii) reactive enforcement;
and (iii) voluntary compliance.
Proactive enforcement relies heavily on inspections and expanded
investigations when violations are detected. Orders to pay and prosecutions are used to
achieve both specific and general deterrence. In this form of enforcement, inspections
are carried out in order to determine whether or not violations are taking place, rather
than as a response to a specific complaint.11 Proactive inspections may be used in
forms of ‘strategic enforcement’, where employers in sectors known to have high levels
of violations are targeted for inspection.12 The underlying assumption of this strategy is
that the proactive approach will not only detect un/underreported violations, but also that
the fear of possible inspection will create pressure for employers in these sectors to
improve compliance. Moreover, the proactive approach is favoured by many labour
organizations and advocates as workers in high violation sectors are often the most
vulnerable to employer power and the least likely to complain.13
Proactive enforcement can take other forms as well. For example, among others,
Weil14 discusses the use of a strategy known as the ‘hot cargo’ boycott, which utilizes a
provision of the Fair Labor and Standards Act in the US to enable state boycotts or the
embargoing of goods that are manufactured in violation of the Act. This tactic caused
garment manufacturers to pressure subcontractors to improve compliance with
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legislated standards. Additional forms of proactive enforcement may come from
collaborative efforts between government agencies or even forms of tri-partite
collaboration, integrating unions and civil society organizations into the enforcement
process alongside government and employers.15
Reactive enforcement depends on complaints to trigger regulatory intervention,
and typically emphasizes negotiated settlements, reserving more coercive measures
such as orders to pay and prosecution for egregious cases. The most common form of
reactive enforcement is complaints from individual workers who have experienced
violations of legislated standards.16 Typically, these complaints will initiate an
investigation by the relevant government agency, which may lead to prosecution and
penalties for employers and settlements for workers17 As workers in precarious jobs are
often reluctant to raise complaints about violations due to fear of job loss, systems of
anonymous complaints are considered to be more conducive to protecting workers’
rights in such situations.18 As a means to increase pressure on employers to comply
with legislated standards, Kent Elson19 argues for private prosecution of employers who
violate employment standards, suggesting that this would not only punish violators but
could also foster new norms of compliance through both stiff penalties and social
stigma.
As with proactive enforcement, forms of collaboration between public and private
actors have been identified as offering possibilities for reactive enforcement.
Collaborative strategies may include public regulation of private (voluntary) codes of
conduct,20 and union-government partnerships in conducting labour standards
inspections.21 As with collaborative proactive strategies, the aim in these approaches is
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to bring state agencies and private actors together in the enforcement process to
improve compliance. Using the Australian case as an example, however, Hardy and
Howe22 caution that as unions are integrated into this process, they may be drawn
towards reactive strategies and lose their capacity to engage in preventative (proactive)
forms of enforcement.
Finally, voluntary compliance is an enforcement strategy that depends heavily
on education for both workers and employers about legislated standards, as well as
employer strategies of ‘self-regulation’ through private codes of conduct. Voluntary
compliance strategies may also lead to negotiated settlements when complaints arise.
Prosecutions may be used, but generally as a last resort. With practices and principles
of corporate social responsibility becoming commonplace in recent years, employer
self-regulation often takes the form of voluntary codes of conduct that companies
develop themselves to regulate working conditions, including working conditions across
transnational supply chains.23 As they are voluntary, there is great variation across
these types of codes, though they may build from principles of international labour
standards developed through the ILO. While they are developed and implemented
privately, they may involve forms of ‘monitored self-regulation’, for example through
third-party auditing of the application of the standards contained within the codes.24
Advocates of self-regulation/voluntary compliance through corporate codes of conduct
suggest that such codes hold potential to improve compliance with legislation as
companies will be more inclined to comply with practices they develop themselves.
Critics, however, warn that self-regulation without backing by ‘hard law’ does not offer
an effective mechanism of monitoring or enforcement.25
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Governments may play a role in promoting voluntary compliance strategies as
well. Specifically, government strategies to foster voluntary compliance include
producing and disseminating information materials to raise awareness about legislated
standards,26 engaging in ‘naming and shaming’ campaigns to publicize information
about egregious violations,27 and developing public procurement policy agreements that
award government contracts to companies that have strong compliance practices.28 The
assumption underlying these practices is that the role of government should be to foster
employer ‘self-reliance’ in complying with legislation, rather than taking a proactive
approach to enforcement or relying on prosecutions and fines.
Each of these models of enforcement is outlined in specific detail in the report’s
sections on the ESA (S.II), the OHSA (S.III), and in its discussion of ‘best practices’ (S.
V).
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II. EMPLOYMENT STANDARDS
A. Ontario Legislation -- The Employment Standards Act
ES are legislated standards that set minimum terms and conditions of employment in
areas such as wages, working time, vacations and leaves, termination and severance.
ES generally apply to most workers in a labour market but are often the only source of
workplace protection for workers in non-unionized jobs. The majority of Ontario’s over 6
million workers in over 370,000 workplaces rely on ES. This section of the paper
provides both a chronological overview of the development of ES legislation in Ontario,
and a summary of recent reforms to Ontario’s Employment Standards Act (ESA).
1.1969-1995
Ontario’s ESA was enacted in 1969. The ESA provided a minimum wage for both men
and women and established maximum hours of work at 8 per day and 48 per week. An
overtime rate of time and a half was set for anything over 48 hours a week and the Act
established the right to refuse overtime work. It also provided for time and a half on 7
statutory holidays and guaranteed 2 weeks of paid vacation per year. The principles
behind the development of the Act were consistent with normative framework outlined
above. Specifically, the legislation was designed to set minimum standards for Ontario’s
labour market and provide legislative protection for those most vulnerable to employer
exploitation.29
The core standards of the ESA were altered through minor reforms in the 1970s,
1980s, and early 1990s, most of which added to the scope of legislative protections for
workers in the province. Termination notice requirements were added in 1971. In 1972,
a pregnancy leave provision was added that gave employees with at least 1 year of
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seniority in workplaces of 25 or more up to 12 weeks (6 and 6) of pre- and post-natal
leave, and entitlement to their former or a comparable position. In 1975, the overtime
pay (time-and-one-half) threshold was reduced from 48 hours to 44, and pregnancy
leave provisions were expanded to cover up to 17 weeks of leave. In 1976, the
province introduced a differential (lower) minimum wage rate for servers in the
hospitality industry.
Severance pay provisions were introduced in 1981.30 These provisions provided
employees with a minimum of 5 years of service with 1 week’s pay for each year
worked up to a maximum of 26 weeks in cases of mass termination. Under
amendments made in 1987, employers were required to provide termination notices 1
week in advance for any employee employed longer than 3 months, with an additional
week’s notice for each year of employment, up to a maximum of 8 weeks.31 Workers
with 5 years of employment at a business with an annual payroll of at least $2.5 million
became eligible for severance pay. In addition, the new severance provisions were
extended to workers whose temporary lay-off extended beyond 35 weeks in a 52-week
period. Further, in the case of mass layoffs, the legislation required that employers
provide the Ministry of Labour (MOL) with an explanation of the economic
circumstances surrounding the termination, a summary of consultations with employees
and the affected community, any proposed measures to help those laid off, and a
statistical profile of affected workers.
Bankruptcy protection legislation was introduced in the Spring of 1991.32 The
Employee Wage Protection Program was designed to provide employees with
compensation for unpaid wages, commissions, overtime wages, vacation pay, holiday
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pay, and termination and severance pay, up to a maximum of $5000 per employee.
The program was administered through the Employment Standards Branch of the MOL
and Employment Standards Officers (ESOs) were given the ability to order payments
under the program. The program was funded out of general provincial revenues. Upon
payment of a claim, the government would attempt to recover funds from employers and
businesses.
2. 1995-2001
Beginning in 1995, Ontario’s ES underwent a three-stage reform process. The reforms
pursued constituted a break from the normative framework of ES outlined above.
Specifically, they were designed primarily to promote ‘flexibility’ for employers, in
particular through changes to working time standards introduced in 2001.
First, in 1995 the Employee Wage Protection Program was terminated and the
minimum wage was frozen at $6.85, a wage freeze that would last for 9 years. Second,
in 1996, the Employment Standards Improvement Act reduced the time limit for workers
to register formal complaints from 2 years to 6 months, and placed a $10,000 limit on
monetary awards for ESA violations, regardless of the value of lost wages. The Act also
introduced a provision preventing unionized employees from filing ES complaints with
the MOL, requiring employees with union representation to resolve ES complaints
through the grievance arbitration process, placing the cost of administering ESA
complaints in the hands of unions, rather than the Ministry.33
Finally, major legislative changes were implemented in the ESA, 2000. These
amendments increased weekly maximum hours of work from 48 to 60 and allowed for
the calculation of overtime pay to be based on an averaging of overtime hours across a
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4-week period: employers could schedule overtime hours without compensation at time
and a half provided the total for the 4-week period was less than 176 hours. They also
revoked the system of government permits required for excess hours (more than 48 per
week), introducing instead a requirement for employee ”consent” to the new excess
hours and overtime averaging provisions. The ESA 2000 also introduced anti-reprisal
protections and family crisis leave. In addition, the government expanded the parental
leave provisions of the Act, to bring them in line with federal amendments to the
Employment Insurance program, allowing for up to 52 weeks of unpaid, job protected
leave for birth mothers and up to 37 weeks for new parents (generally fathers or
adoptive parents).
3. 2004-10
Between 2004 and 2010, ES reforms displayed a partial return to decent work
principles, with the introduction of ES legislation targeted at particular groups of
‘vulnerable workers’: specifically, workers employed through temporary help agencies
and live-in caregivers.34 In developing this legislation, the government assumed that
most employers will comply with minimum standards legislation and aimed to target
legislative reforms at employers in sectors where violations are high.
The Employment Standards Amendment Act (Temporary Help Agencies) 2009
developed new standards for workers in temporary help agencies. It introduced
requirements that temporary agencies must provide information about the agency
(name and contact information) and working conditions (incl. pay, hours, nature of work)
to workers. It extended ESA coverage for public holiday pay and termination and
severance to these workers. Finally, it introduced some prohibitions on charging fees to
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clients for entering into employment agreements with assignment employees.
Specifically, agencies are permitted to charge clients a fee if an employee is offered a
permanent position in first six months of an assignment with that client.
In 2010, the Employment Protection for Foreign Nationals Act (Live-in Caregivers
and Others), introduced a series of legislative protections for those employed as live-in
caregivers. Specifically, it banned fees charged by recruiters and employers, allowed
live-in-caregivers up to 3! years to make a complaint to recover prohibited fees,
prohibited reprisals against live-in caregivers for exercising their rights under the
legislation, and prohibited an employer or recruiter from taking possession of a live-in
caregiver’s property (incl. documents such as passports). The Act also authorized ESOs
to proactively enforce the legislation.
4. 2010 to present
Finally, the most recent reforms to the ESA were introduced through the Open for
Business Act, 2010 (OBA). This Act focused on enforcement, modifying enforcement
practices with the stated aim of making these practices more ‘efficient’. Specifically, the
OBA alters ES enforcement procedures fundamentally by, among other things, requiring
workers facing ES violations to first approach their employers for a resolution,
mandating that workers and employers provide information on their claims before they
will be accepted by the MOL, and giving new powers to ESOs to facilitate settlements
between workers and employers, including unprecedented discretion over monetary
compensation for workers.35 Like the ESA reforms of 2001, the OBA was a clear
departure from the norms of decent work outlined above, prioritizing the efficient
resolution of claims over the aim of protecting vulnerable workers.
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First, employees are required to notify their employer before the MOL will initiate
an ES claim.36 The assumption behind this requirement is that “[m]ost employers want
to do the right thing and they will often remedy the situation promptly and voluntarily, if
they agree there is a valid claim.”37 Second, the amendments place responsibility on
individual workers to collect the information for their complaints, reducing the
requirements on the investigative procedure itself. If an ESO determines that there is
insufficient evidence provided by an employee, then the officer may determine there is
no violation. Finally, the amendments promote a voluntary approach to ES regulation,
specifically through amendments that give ESOs a role in bringing employers and
employees to a mediated settlement, with the Act stating that “[n]either party would
have to participate in such a settlement unless they agree to it.”38
In addition to the OBA, the MOL struck an Employment Standards Task Force to
address the backlog of 14,000 ES complaints that have accumulated in recent years.
The Task Force has a two-year mandate to clear this backlog and will operate under the
aegis of the reformed ESA. The Task Force will not engage in a process of proactive
investigation into ESA violations, but will investigate these existing claims “based on an
officer's review of written materials and through telephone discussions with parties.”39
The Task Force will also utilize the new emphasis on voluntary, mediated settlements
as a means to resolve claims and to create efficiencies in the enforcement process.
B. Mapping Employment Standards Enforcement
Workers’ access to minimum ES depends on the government’s ability to promote and
enforce such standards. The legislation provides the Director of Employment Standards
and ESOs with broad powers of investigation (e.g., entering business premises and
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requiring production of records for inspection). Officers have extensive authority to
resolve complaints of violations including settlements, orders to pay, fines, compliance
orders and prosecutions. There is no statutory provision specifying how investigations
and enforcement are to be done. In practice, it is the policies and procedures
established by the Branch that determine the choices Officers can make in investigation
and enforcement techniques.
The MOL has three main strategies of ES enforcement: self-regulation and
compliance by employers; self-enforcement by employees when employers are noncompliant; and proactive enforcement and education to improve employer compliance,
largely by targeting employers most likely to be in violation of the ESA. It does this by:
•

Providing information to employers and employees, encouraging employers to
comply voluntarily;

•

Investigating and resolving employees’ complaints of employer violations;

•

Conducting inspections of employers that are likely to be in violation; and,

•

Deterring violations through appropriate penalties.40

With almost 6 million employees in over 370,000 workplaces the MOL relies on
employers to voluntarily comply with the ESA. When employers do not comply,
individual workers are responsible for seeking their unpaid wages or ES entitlements
from their employer and, through this process, may file a complaint for ES violations at
the MOL. The MOL also undertakes proactive enforcement of employers that are at risk
of ES violations. The reality is, however, that the majority of resources on ES
enforcement go to investigating individual complaints of employer violations – that is, to
reactive enforcement measures. The ensuing discussion examines these compliance
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and enforcement activities.
1. Employer Self-Regulation / Voluntary Compliance
The self-regulation strategy hinges on employers acting as good corporate citizens. The
MOL seeks to assist employers’ compliance by providing the following types of
information:41
Phone: The Employment Standards Information Centre, administered by Service
Ontario, provides information about ES. It assisted almost 350,000 in 2009-2010. Legal
advice is not provided. The toll-free call centre provides interpreters for its multi-lingual
phone service.
Email: The MOL responds to emails from employers and employees – it prepared 9,000
such responses in 2010.
Website: The MOL has a variety of information tools explaining provisions of the ESA,
how they may apply, and how to file an ESA claim. Videos showing employers what to
expect in an inspection are provided as are videos on what workers can expect once
they file a claim. The Ministry also communicates by social media (e.g., facebook and
twitter). General information has been translated into 23 languages.42

2. Self-enforcement
When employers do not comply with ES, it is up to the individual worker to seek remedy
from their employer and, failing that, by filing a claim with the MOL for unpaid wages
and other ES entitlements. Historically, the MOL has encouraged employees to try and
recover unpaid wages and ES prior to filing a claim. For example, when the MOL
introduced on-line claims process in 2006-07, it posted a Self-Help kit for employees.
This kit was intended to assist workers in learning about their ESA entitlements,
determining which ES had been violated, and calculating the amount of unpaid wages
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owing. Employees were then asked to contact their employer to obtain wages owing.
With the passage of the OBA in 2010, workers are now required (with some
exceptions)43 to first contact their employer to seek their ES entitlements. If a worker is
unsuccessful in enforcing their ES entitlements, s/he is then allowed to file a complaint
at the MOL for investigation.
(i) Individual Claims Investigation
In general, after a claim was filed by a worker, an ESO investigated the claim to
determine whether or not, and if so which, ES violations had occurred. The ESO
evaluated evidence provided by the employer and the employee and made a
determination on the claim. The institutional practice during investigations was to seek
information from both the claimant and employer through telephone calls, letters and
fact-finding meetings in which both parties were given the opportunity to present their
case. To varying degrees, ESOs could gather evidence in ways that accounted for
some of the barriers faced by people in low-wage and precarious employment (e.g., not
understanding ES and claims process, language and literacy barriers). However, factors
such as increasing numbers of claims, on-line filing of claims with information missing,
and difficulties encountered in reaching the parties during ESO working hours
contributed to a growing back-log in complaints and pressure to change the
investigation process. The OBA introduced a new requirement that certain information
be provided in writing on the claim form before a worker’s claim would be allowed to
proceed. Further, the OBA introduced a section (s. 102.1) that allows ESOs to deal with
undue delays by making a decision on the best information available. The OBA places a
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greater burden on workers to provide evidence of employer violations, rather than a
reverse onus on employers to refute allegations.
During the 1970’s the MOL used individual claims as “levers to pry open and
expose to scrutiny” a company’s entire range of operations. ESOs were required to
conduct full audits to disclose all violations for current employees. The number of
employees receiving payments because of investigations and inspections in 1971 was
52,263. Full audits were generally done as a follow-up to every individual complaint. But
rising caseload of complaints in the early 1970s saw the branch shift to ‘complainant
only’ and away from expanded investigations protecting all workers.44 The number of
expanded investigations has declined since the 1970s. As noted by Ontario’s Auditor
General in 2004, while violations were found to exist in about 70 percent of complaints
filed, few investigations were expanded to protect the employer’s current employees
who may also be facing violations.45 In 2009-10, the Ministry conducted 99 expanded
investigations where a workplace was identified for an inspection based on the results
found during an individual claim investigation. In that same year, 20,762 claims were
investigated and violations assessed totalled almost $64.4 million ($42.9 million of
which was subject to bankruptcy or insolvency).46 There is no follow-up to inform current
employees of what their entitlements may be under the ESA to create incentives for
future employer compliance.
(ii) Individual Claims Resolution
Over 80 percent of claims are resolved during the investigation process. Claims are
either withdrawn by the claimant, a settlement is reached between the employer and
employee, the employer complies with an ESO determination of wages owing, or a
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claim is denied. In less than 20 percent of cases, the ESO issues an Order to Pay to the
employer or Director. Claimants and employers have the right to appeal an ESO order
to the Ontario Labour Relations Board (OLRB). But few do. Less than 5 percent of such
claims proceed to appeal at the OLRB.
Institutional practices for arriving at settlements have allowed claimants and
employers to enter into settlements during the claims process. Indeed, the complaint is
deemed to have been ‘settled’ as long as the ESO receives the terms of settlement in
writing. In such cases, any orders respecting the employers’ contraventions are void 47.
Historically, ESOs were not supposed to “negotiate, promote, or ‘broker’ settlement
agreements.”48 However, over time, growing pressures were placed on workers to settle
during the claims process.49 There are no data available on the number of claims
settled below statutory minimums.
In response to a substantial backlog in claims in 2009-10, the OBA introduced
new powers for ESOs to “attempt to effect a settlement.” Employers and employees are
given the option of discussing settlement, with the ESO playing a mediating role.
Should a settlement not be reached, the ESO resumes the investigation and decisionmaking. An initial pilot project of facilitated settlements found that 21 percent of cases
that went to a decision-making meeting were resolved through settlements and that
these cases resulted in settlements of, on average, 17 percent lower than was
assessed to be owed by the ESO.50
When an employer voluntarily complies with an ESO decision that an ES
entitlement must be paid to a claimant, the employer either pays what they should have
in the first place, or less if a lower settlement is accepted. There are no penalties or

!

$+

other costs to the employer. Further, when an ES complaint is settled without an order
to pay being issued, there can be no fines levied through contravention notices.
(iii) Penalties
The ESA sets out a variety of sanctions that can be used against employers that are
found in violation of the Act. However, the MOL does not provide guidelines or criteria
for the use of the sanctions and penalties listed below:
Order to Pay Wages (s. 103) is issued when an ESO finds that wages are owing and
the employer has not volunteered to pay the wages. This order is subject to a
$10,000 cap on unpaid wages (s. 103(2)) and will include an additional
administrative fee of 10 percent of wages owing.
Directors’ Order to Pay Wages (s. 106 and 2. 107) is issued to a director of a
corporation where the employer has not paid the wages required under an
Order to Pay.
Order for Compensation (s. 104, 74.16, 74.17) deals with those matters under the Act in
which damages are awarded when an ESO determines that an employee
has suffered a loss. These orders relate to the reprisals, leaves of absence,
retail business establishments and lie detector provisions of the Act.
Order to Reinstate (s. 104 and 74.17) may be issued in the matters outlined under
compensation orders.
Compliance Order (s. 108) may be issued when an officer finds that an employer
contravened any part of the Act or regulations. Compliance orders may be
issued if there has been voluntary compliance to ensure that there is a record
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of the employer’s violation and enforcement activity. Such orders require
employers to cease violating ES provisions specified by a certain time.
Notice of Contravention (s. 113) are monetary penalties for violations set out in
regulation (O. Reg. 289/01) and generally increase from $250 to $1,000 per
contravention per person violated.
Prosecution (s. 132) of employers that contravene the Act or its regulations may take
place and if so, on conviction, individual employers may be liable to fines up
to a maximum of $50,000 or imprisonment of not more than 12 months, or
both, and corporations are liable for fines up to a maximum of $100,000 and
increased fines for subsequent convictions. .
ESOs have the discretion to use or not use the above orders and Part 1 Tickets in
inspections and investigations. As Graph 1 demonstrates, the MOL’s preferred sanction
is to issue Compliance Orders. In 2009-2010, 20,762 claims were investigated finding
that employers owed $64.4 million to workers yet only 86 fines (notice of contravention)
and 298 tickets ($360) were issued. Prosecutions are determined by the Employment
Standards Branch and Legal Services Branch of the MOL the latter of which conducts
the prosecutions. Prosecutions are for non-compliance with Orders issued from the
MOL and do not directly remedy unpaid wages for workers. The Ministry initiated 13
prosecutions of employers in violation in 2009-2010.51
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Graph 1. ES Penalties
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been found owing to workers. As Table 1 demonstrates, a substantial amount of the
monies owed to workers are from employers who are insolvent or bankrupt. Recovery of
unpaid wages in cases of bankruptcy or insolvency is difficult because workers become
one of several creditors’ owed money and are paid subject to priority ranking as
determined by federal bankruptcy and insolvency legislation. The MOL assists
employees by filing Proofs of Claim with the Trustee in Bankruptcy or the Monitor. The
recession of 2008-9 saw a dramatic rise in bankruptcies.
Table 1 illustrates that an average of 50 to 54 percent of wages assessed to be
owed during investigation (excluding bankruptcies) were recovered between 2006 and
2010 through the MOL claims process. A further 6 to 9 percent are recovered by
workers during the Labour Board appeal process. Collection agencies recovered
between 12 to 16 percent of wages owing in cases sent to collections. 52
By far, the most successful recovery of wages owing is through proactive
inspections. Between 92 to 99 percent of wages assessed during inspections from
2006/07 to 2009/10 were recovered for workers.
Table 1 Wages Assessed and Wages Recovered
Fiscal
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Fiscal

Fiscal

Fiscal

2006-07
($000’s)

2007-08
($000’s)

2008-09
($000’s)

2009-10
($000’s)

Wages owing assed from claims
investigation
Wages owing assessed from
inspections
Wages owing assessed from
bankruptcies and insolvencies
Total wages owing

$23,335

$16,560

$15,118

$19,737

$1,905

$1,289

$2,115

$1,759

$23,424

$12,309

$48,753

$42,900

$48,664

$30,158

$65,986

$62,637

Wages recovered from employers
during claims investigation process
Wages recovered from employers
during proactive inspections
Wages paid from employer appeals ($
held in trust)53
Wages recovered from private
collection agency on contract with MOL
Total wages recovered

$12,639

$8,201

$7,736

$10,323

$1,748

$1,282

$1,928

$1,737

$2,017

$1,425

$952

$1,642

$1,000

$889

$1,031

$1,125

$17,404

$11,777

$11,647

$14,827

Source: MOL, Employment Standards Program Annual Reports 2007-2008 to 2009-2010

3. Proactive Inspections
According to the MOL, proactive inspections aim to: ensure compliance with standards;
communicate the requirements of the ESA; raise awareness and understanding by
employees and employers of their rights and responsibilities; and promote self-reliance
in the workplace.54 Consistent with a largely reactive approach, the MOL does not use
inspections to address individual employee’s complaints of ES violations.
The MOL currently focuses efforts and resources largely on investigating claims
of ES violations from individuals against former employers. However, this has not
always been the focus. Prior to changes to the Act in the late 1960’s, the bulk of the
Branch’s enforcement activity in hours of work and minimum wage protections involved
conducting surprise spot checks or planned visits to investigate companies’ compliance
with the law. With new powers to collect wages beyond the minimum standards in 1969,
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a shift from proactive enforcement through inspections to individual complaints began to
take place.55
Much of the focus during the 1980’s and 1990s was to avoid large backlogs of
unresolved claims. As Graph 2 illustrates, ES inspections of workplaces were almost
non-existent during that same period.
Graph 2. Proactive Inspections
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In April 2004, then Minister of Labour Chris Bentley announced that the
government was ‘putting enforcement back on the agenda.’56 Alongside legislative
changes to the hours of work provisions, the government claimed it would focus on
improving education and awareness around both workers’ rights and employers’
obligations, shorten the time to process claims, dedicate resources to conduct 2,000
proactive inspections, improve collections, and increase the number of prosecutions.
In 2004, the MOL allocated 20 ESOs to conduct a target of 2,000 inspections per year.
The overall strategy is thus to inspect non-complying companies, or those at highest
risk for non-compliance, in order to bring these companies into compliance. The

!

%&

Dedicated Enforcement Team conducts inspections in sectors that historically have the
highest rates of non-compliance such as retail, restaurant and business management
services. Such criteria for targeted inspections are based on violations confirmed
through individual claims brought forward. In addition, where sectors of people in
precarious jobs have been successful in bringing attention to substandard working
conditions, the MOL has responded with targeted sectoral inspections (e.g., garment
workers during the 1990s, temporary help agency workers and live-in caregivers in the
early 2000s).57 There does not appear to be any benchmarking or evaluation program to
assess changes in compliance rates in the sectors targeted.
The Administration Manual for Employment Standards (AMES) outlines how
officers are required to conduct inspections. The ESO generally gives the employer 10
days notice of the proactive inspection. The employer is asked to prepare payroll
records for the inspection. The ESO interviews the employer, as well as a selection of
employees, to identify any violations, and performs a test audit on payroll records (for
example, in a workplace with 60 or fewer employees, the officer will review 5
employees’ records). If the ESO identifies ES violations, action is taken to remedy the
contravention. This action is achieved by the employer doing a self audit to determine
how much is owed, for example, in unpaid wages, unpaid overtime or public holiday
pay. If an employer does not make a voluntary payment, the ESO may issue an order to
pay.
Inspection results suggest that the purpose of inspections is to encourage employers
to comply. For example, in 2008-09, of 2,135 inspections covering 60,000 employees,
over $1.9 million in unpaid wages was uncovered through the inspections. Besides
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paying wages that should have been paid in the first place, enforcement activity focused
on encouraging compliance rather than mandating penalties for violations of wage
standards. This activity included issuing:
•

487 tickets (of about $360 each)

•

2,883 Compliance orders (request compliance by specified time)

•

68 Notices of Contravention (escalating fines per violation per occurrence); and,

•

2 orders to pay58

As Table 2 demonstrates, proactive inspections reveal violations of core standards
such as minimum wage, unpaid wages and overtime. They also offer greater chances of
recovering those wages. Moreover, proactive inspections uncover violations of
standards experienced by currently employed workers, whereas individual claims, more
typical of reactive approaches, tend to uncover violations reported by workers after the
employment relationship is severed. This is a key distinction.
Table 2 Comparison of ES Individual Claims to Proactive Inspections
Violations confirmed in
Violations confirmed in
individual claims 2007-2008
proactive inspections 20072008
Unpaid wages
33%
46%
Vacation pay
24%
6%
Termination
Overtime

22%
5%

0
15%

Public holidays

5%

29%

Source: Ontario MOL (2008) Employment Standards Program Annual Report, 2007-2008.

While roughly half of unpaid wages owed are recovered through the individual
claims process (barring bankruptcy), 92 to 99 percent of unpaid wages confirmed during
proactive inspections are recovered through this process. This finding, depicted in the
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table above, suggests that proactive inspections are more effective than the
investigation of individual claims in recovering workers unpaid wages.
C. Assessing Employment Standards Enforcement
The re-regulation of ES in the late 20th century through inadequate funding, economic
restructuring, and the shift from proactive measures to individual claims resolution, has
increasingly placed the onus for enforcement on workers, on the one hand, and
voluntary compliance by employers, on the other hand.
The focus of this report is on people in precarious jobs and enforcement
practices. Precarious jobs are taken to mean work for remuneration, characterized by
high levels of job and income insecurity, low wages and limited access to regulatory
protections and employment benefits. Moreover, precarious jobs are often associated
with temporary employment and self-employment (especially the own account variety,
where the self-employed person does not employ others), rather than permanent paid
employment. Workers in precarious jobs also tend to lack meaningful access to
employment rights. As precarious employment has developed over recent decades, it
has become marked increasingly by processes of racialization and gendering, in other
words the ways in which women, immigrant, migrant and racialized workers are
incorporated into the labour market, the association of specific forms of employment
with these groups of workers, and the over-representation of women and racialized
workers in forms of employment characterized by high levels of insecurity. Furthermore,
non-racialized and/or Canadian-born workers who work in particular sectors, and/or
alongside women, immigrants, migrants and racialized workers, are compelled to labour
under similar conditions in work that is marked by feminization and racialization.59
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Precarious employment is not new; in fact, many of these conditions are
longstanding. They are reminiscent of the “sweating system” of outsourcing in the
garment industry, of employment practices in employment agencies, and of immigration
practices during the nation-building periods of the late 1800s.60 It is not the case that all
employers are violating the ESA or attempting to evade core labour standards.
However, precarious employment is growing and ES violations, evasion and erosion are
therefore having a much larger impact on the broader labour market than during
previous eras. Responsible employers are placed under growing pressure when
undercut by employers who violate the ESA. As practices linked to precarious
employment spread across industries, strategies to lower labour costs and liabilities
also spread. The Ontario government is thus facing increasing numbers of individual
complaints of employer violation at the same time that employers are shifting forms of
violation and evasion through ‘new’ employment practices. As U.S. researchers
studying precarious employment reflect, “[w]hen the floor of labor standards is driven
down or dismantled altogether, all of us are affected, not just those at the very
bottom.”61
Erosion of employment standards have, as a Law Commission of Canada report
observes, developed both actively and passively.62 Active erosion of standards has
occurred through explicit exemptions in the scope of the ESA being adopted through
regulatory changes. For example, workers in agriculture, information technology, and
construction do not have the same protections for hours of work and overtime that other
workers have. Changes to the ESA in 2000 actively reduced government regulation of
workplace standards, promoted greater employer control over work time, normalized
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non-standard employment relationships and increased the vulnerability of workers in
non-unionized workplaces.63 More passive erosion of standards also undermined the
ESA’s capacity to protect workers in low-wage and precarious jobs. From the late
1970’s until the early 2000s, Ontario’s minimum wage was substantially below the
poverty level.64 This degradation has contributed to an expanding low-wage labour
market in Canada. Data from the OECD show that Canada is second only to the U.S. as
a low-wage country. The proportion of Canadian workers who are low paid (less than
two-thirds of the median wage) is about double the level in continental Europe (on the
magnitude of low wage work in contemporary Ontario, see also Noack and Vosko in this
LCO series).65
Active or passive, employers have adopted strategies for work organization over
the past 3 decades that evade core labour laws and create legal distance between
themselves and their workers.66 Even harder to quantify than violations of ES are
practices of evasion, as they often involve workers found in forms of employment
outside the scope of the ESA or differentiated within the ESA – for example, the growing
number of workers in forms of employment that fall outside of standard full-time,
permanent employment with a single employer.67 Over a third of total employment is
part-time, temporary or own-account self-employment. Yet labour laws, regulatory
regimes and employment benefits are still based almost exclusively on an employment
model (a standard employment relationship) developed after World War II, which linked
decent wages, benefits, working conditions and job security to a full-time continuous
employment relationship between an employer and worker where the worker works on
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the employer’s premises under direct supervision, a form of employment in which nonracialized men were over-represented.68
Historic exclusions of certain types of work organization from ES protections,
such as own-account self-employment, have created incentives for employers to move
workers into “new” forms of employment. Contracting out work that can be done inhouse is yet another practice that is re-emerging and it has surfaced in sectors from the
newspaper industry to home care provision. Contracting out was a common practice in
garment production and manufacturing more generally in the beginning of the 20th
century. Externalizing employment costs to temporary help agencies is yet another
growing strategy for just-in-time labour sourcing. Such practices shift the legal liability
that employers have for their employees, working conditions and employment benefits
onto intermediaries and, in the case of misclassified independent contractors (i.e., selfemployed workers), onto workers themselves. While employers may argue that these
strategies are necessary in an increasingly global market with intense international
competition, this rationale does not justify these practices in Ontario. Many employers
and industries that are engaged in outsourcing, indirect hiring, and misclassifying
workers are part of distinctly local markets, such as restaurants, business services
including janitorial and courier services, construction, trucking, home health care,
warehousing and manufacturing of locally consumed goods.69
Few studies document the scope of violations of ES; but the ones that are
available confirm substantial formal violations. In the late 1990’s, a federal government
Labour Standards Evaluation surveyed employers and found that 25 percent of
employers were in widespread violation of the Canada Labour Code and 50 percent
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were in partial violation.70 These findings were confirmed a decade later by Statistics
Canada71 and the Workers’ Action Centre.72
A survey of people in low-wage and precarious work in the Greater Toronto Area
conducted in 2011 provides yet another window into the violations that some of these
workers face. This non-randomized survey of 520 casual, temporary, non-standard and
low-wage workers conducted in 2011 sought to document the types of violations people
in precarious work face. The findings included the following:
• 20 percent earned less than minimum wage
• 39 percent failed to receive earned overtime pay
• 36 percent were fired or laid off without termination pay or notice
• 34 percent struggled to get vacation pay
• 33 percent were owed wages and of those only 23 per cent were ever paid73
These findings do not indicate that all or most employers violate ES. Many employers
do comply with the ESA. However, the prevalence of violations undermines employers
who do comply with minimum labour standards and contributes to a downward pressure
on wages and working conditions.
Over the past 30 years, resources and staffing for ES regulation has not kept
pace with increases in workers’ covered, number of workplaces and complexity of
working relationships. While the number of workers covered by the ESA has increased
by fully 24 percent between 1997 and 2007, the funding for the ES Program has
decreased by fully 33 percent. Even recent increases to the Program in the 2009/10
budget leave it with funding levels of over 10 percent below 1997 levels.74 With over
370,000 Ontario workplaces, ES regulation is made more difficult by the growth in
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smaller companies. Companies employing fewer than 50 employees make up more
than 92 percent of Ontario’s businesses and 66 percent of ESA claims in 2009/10.75
1. Effectiveness of ESA regulation
The growing trend towards individualized and privatized systems of workplace
regulation is increasing workers’ exposure to market forces. Ontario ES regulation uses
a mix of “hard” law and “soft” law approaches. Soft law approaches include the
government’s reliance on voluntary employer compliance or self-regulatory behaviour
from firms. Detection of violations is largely individualized through workers’ self
enforcement and individual claims. Hard law approaches are reserved for employers
that do not voluntarily comply with assessed violations. These include orders to pay,
compliance orders, and fines or prosecution for particularly egregious employers.
(i) Self enforcement / Individualization of claims
The majority of resources for enforcing ES still go towards investigating individual
complaints of employer violations. This despite the fact that, as Saunders and Dutil
note, the “practice of dealing with compliance one case at a time is expensive and risks
overloading the available capacity.”76 There has been an increase in claims over the
last 5 years from an average of 15,000 claims per year to over 20,000 claims per year.
By 2010, a backlog in workers’ complaints against employers for unpaid wages had
grown to over 17,000.77
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(ii) Barriers to self-enforcement while on the job.
On an annual basis, less than 1 percent of workplaces are at risk of being inspected for
ES violations. Enforcement of ES and MOL detection of violations largely relies on
individual workers. Yet workers, particularly those in low-wage and precarious work,
face significant challenges to enforcing their employment standards while still on the
job. The ESA is supposed to remedy the unequal power relationship between workers
and employers. There are no institutionalized mechanisms that enable employee voice
in ES enforcement. Unlike Ontario’s regulation of the Occupational Health and Safety
Act, workers cannot make anonymous complaints that will initiate MOL Health and
Safety inspections of the workplace. Nor is there interim reinstatement pending
investigation that is afforded to fired workers in specific situations under the Ontario
Labour Relations Act (OLRA)
There are many factors shaping how workers respond to ES violations. Workers
must consider factors such as: wages needed to support themselves and their families;
savings; eligibility for and capacity to survive on Employment Insurance benefits while
searching for new employment; the realities of getting another job at the same or similar
wages; the impacts on immigration status and family sponsorship; and whether they will
be successful in securing the minimum ES they should have received in the first place.
Workers under the Live-in Caregiver and Temporary Foreign Worker Programs face
even greater challenges. Caregivers must complete the equivalent of 24 months of
employment within 4 years before being able to apply for permanent residency and are
required to live in their employer’s home. People who work under the Seasonal
Agricultural Program and low-skill Temporary Foreign Worker Program (TFWP) are tied
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to one employer for a specific term. Federal immigration program requirements create
conditions ripe for abuse and that limit what workers can do to address violations.78
Workers without regularized immigration status have the same ESA rights as
other workers. But non-status workers face substantial barriers to enforcing their rights;
many in this group face substandard conditions of employment but do not complain due
to implicit or explicit threats of reporting their status to immigration officials and the
potential of deportation.
Workers’ ability and willingness to confront employers over ES violations is also
shaped by labour market conditions. Worker’s decisions may be shaped by their ability
to get a new job at the same or better pay and job security. For workers facing
substandard employment conditions, the fraying social safety net reduces workers’
options even more. While Ontario had the third highest unemployment rate in 2009, it
had the lowest level of EI coverage with only 41.3 percent of unemployed workers
receiving EI benefits.79 Workers that do qualify are only eligible for 55 percent of their
previous wages. For people in low-wage work, EI does not buttress workers displaced
from their jobs for trying to enforce their rights. Besides benefit levels well below the
poverty line, social assistance is not an option for many people who are trying to
regularize their immigration status or sponsor family members. Barriers to filing claims
while workers are on the job result in some workers being owed substantial amounts of
unpaid wages and entitlements. However the $10,000 cap on monies recoverable under
the ESA leaves these workers without remedy through the ES claim process.
Together these factors result in substantial barriers to workers in pursuing their
ES rights. Power imbalances leave workers with little protection against reprisal or job
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loss. It is little surprise that 9 out of 10 workers who file claims for unpaid wages and
entitlements do so after they have left the job.80 It is hard to know how many workers
move from one substandard job to the next, without seeking to recover unpaid wages,
overtime, vacation, termination and public holiday pay. A MOL Inspection of a textile
company in 2004 found that 99 workers were owed more than $136,000 in wages. Yet
only 22 workers had come forward to file ES claims in the months prior to the company
closing down, despite considerable media attention about the case in question. Almost
80 percent of the workers never came forward to make claims for their unpaid wages.
This case suggests that the 15,000 to 20,000 claims filed each year may only be the tip
of the iceberg.
(iii) Barriers in individual claims
Workers are now required to first seek compliance from employers before being allowed
to file an ES claim for unpaid wages. This effectively means that workers must have
access to the internet to learn about rights, knowledge about how to apply abstract legal
rights to their specific conditions, the ability to gather evidence to prove their case, and,
the time and facilities to assemble, package, and deliver it to (former) employers. Most
significantly, mandatory self-enforcement requires that workers have the skill set and
confidence to confront their (former) employer about violations.
There are substantial structural power imbalances between workers and
employers that the ESA seeks to address. Such imbalances in power can create
significant fears in workers. A mandatory requirement for workers to contact their
employer about wages contravenes the purposes of the ESA, both its four fundamental
underlying normative principles (i.e., fairness, social minima, decent work, and
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universality) and its role of providing workers with an administrative process through
which to seek redress for contraventions of the Act.
The MOL’s ES complaints system relies heavily on individuals being able to
access the website. Reliance on internet access creates significant barriers for many
people in precarious employment. Statistics Canada reports that there is a digital divide
in the rate of internet use on the basis of income, education and age. If someone is
poor, older, lives in a rural community, was born outside of Canada, and/or has
relatively low levels of education, s/he is less likely to use or have use of the internet.81
Recent immigrants often have low incomes and hold highly precarious temporary and
part-time jobs. It is workers in such situations, who also often face language barriers,
who are most in need of ES protection and assistance in accessing these rights.
ES stand alone in the regulation of employment rights in having no government
or quasi-government funded assistance for workers who believe their rights have been
violated. The government provides direct and indirect funding for information, education
and legal support in areas of Health and Safety, Workplace Safety and Insurance and
Human Rights, (e.g., Occupational Health Clinics for Ontario Workers, Office of the
Workers Advisor, Human Rights Legal Support Centre). Few legal supports exist for
workers requiring assistance with ESA matters. Ontario’s Community Legal Clinic
system provided ESA representation in 86 cases, 90 brief services and advice for just
over 850 workers in 2008.82 There are no legal aid certificates for ESA matters.
Furthermore, the $10,000 cap on ESA claims means that few private bar lawyers would
represent workers on ESA matters. Workers are left to learn how to make a complaint
on their own. Workers have to go back and forth between the ESA guide (over 100
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pages), the guide to the claim form, and the claim form itself, often going through the
three documents on the MOL website. Workers may not only need legal information
about ES, but also knowledge about how to connect that information to their particular
situations. They may also need assistance in determining entitlements, in preparing the
narrative of what happened, and in identifying supporting documentation. The MOL
does not provide this assistance. The ESA has a time limit of 6 months to file a claim.
Job dislocation and difficulties learning how to pursue ES rights means some workers
only find out about the ES claims process after the 6 month limitation period has
passed. The claims process is difficult for workers who are not proficient in written
English. A 2008 study on linguistic access to legal services provides a rough estimate
that as many as half a million people in Ontario might need an interpreter in pursuing
legal matters.83 There are no language interpretation services to assist in the filing of
claims or investigation of claims. Workers are left to rely on support from friends, family
or community members to assist them in filing a claim.
Literacy is also a factor in enforcing ES through the claims process as workers
are required to submit a claim form to initiate investigation. Low levels of literacy affects
labour market outcomes in a way that establishes a strong link between employability,
income and literacy proficiency. People with lower literacy are more likely to be pulled
into low-wage and precarious work where higher rates of violations occur. Furthermore,
linking literacy and social position, the International Survey of Reading Skills found that
“individuals with low literacy skills were older, less educated, immigrants or had a
mother tongue other than English or French.”84 Even though the ESA is a rightsconferring piece of legislation, the process for addressing violations of those rights has
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shifted to dispute resolution. Workers are expected not only to make a complaint about
the violation but also to make their own case that the employer has violated their rights.
When the employer holds all of the employment records, this process can be time
consuming, with ESOs going back and forth between employer and employee. If there
are fact-finding meetings, workers, who are often in another job, must take time off from
employment, generally without pay. There is no remedy under the ESA to provide
workers with compensation for the substantial time and resources spent trying to obtain
the wages and entitlements they have earned, much less any interest on wages that
may go unpaid for well over a year.
2. Minimum Wage
The Canadian economy has grown in the past 30 years. However, an increasingly
unequal distribution of the rewards of employment is leaving more workers struggling to
get by. In Ontario, provincially-regulated minimum wages have institutionalized low
wages that fail to keep up with the cost of living. Indeed, Ontario’s minimum wage has
fallen 21 percent below the peak levels of the mid-1970s. A person working in Toronto
full-time at minimum wage ($10.25 an hour) has earnings that leave her below Statistics
Canada’s Low Income Cut-Off (LICO).85 Anyone working at minimum wage and
supporting a family would earn well below the LICO. Recent immigrants are particularly
hard hit by low wages. Racialized women workers earn 47 percent less than nonracialized men and 15 percent less than non-racialized women workers.86 This is due, in
part, to the lack of recognition of non-Canadian credentials, experience, and expertise.87
To return to the principle of decency outlined at the beginning of this report, as
Arthurs concludes in his review of the federal labour code, “no worker should be paid so
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little, that, after working full-time at a regular job for a full year they still find themselves
with less money than they need to live at or just above the poverty line.”88 At present
there is no policy formula under the ESA to determine the level of minimum wages.
Rather, they are increased in an ad hoc manner.
3. Compliance, Self-regulation and Enforcement
The MOL announced recently that the backlog of claims will be eliminated by March
2012, at which point it will partner and consult with employer and employee groups as it
shifts resources to inspections: “through our enhanced compliance strategy, we will
continue reaching out to employers through a mix of education, outreach and
enforcement to help ensure we stem any problems before they arise and enforce the
legislation”.89
The compliance model of ES regulation assumes that virtue will trump employer
self-interest.90 One report prepared by the MOL states:
…[e]mployers want to comply with the law because it is the right thing to do. The
ministry is helping them to do just that. Employers also want to comply with the
Employment Standards Act because they know it benefits them – compliance can
reduce legal costs, improve staff retention and increase productivity. The vast majority of
employers know that a fair workplace is a productive and efficient workplace – making
for a better bottom line.91

This view eclipses employers that face conflicts between ES compliance and profits,
particularly when competing with employers operating below minimum standards.
Further, this view of employer behaviour does not recognize the power imbalances
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between employers and employees that the ESA is intended to address. While the MOL
establishes targeted inspections for those at high risk of violation, it leaves a core model
of employer self-regulation and reliance on employer voluntary compliance.92
4. ESA Gaps and Loopholes
The way work is organized has changed drastically over the past 30 years The
ESA does not address these new forms of work organization creating institutional
incentives to reduce employer liabilities.
As noted above, unions are prevented from filing ESA complaints. As the
discussion of OHS later in this paper demonstrates, the participation of unions in the
regulation of OHS has strengthened both health and safety standards and their
enforcement. Arguably, the separation of the collectivized voice of unions from nonunionized workers has weakened ES regulation, particularly in terms of testing new
forms of work at appeals of ESO decisions at the Ontario Labour Relations Board and
pressure for improved minimum standards from which to bargain from.
History demonstrates that employers create new, unforeseen and unprotected
work arrangements. That is why an essential step to improving enforcement must be to
expand the scope of the ESA to include all who work and all work arrangements. In this
way we remove the incentives and statutory mechanisms allowing employers to move
some forms of work beyond the reach of employment standards. By requiring all work to
meet basic minimum employment standards, we can finally establish a level playing
field for employers and a minimum floor of rights and standards for workers and society.
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III. OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND SAFETY (OHS)
A. Ontario Legislation -- The Occupational Health and Safety Act
The Occupational Health and Safety Act (OHSA) is the principal vehicle through which
the Ontario government protects Ontario’s workers from being exposed to unacceptably
hazardous working conditions. It does so by imposing duties on employers,
supervisors, workers and others to comply with standards established by the Act and
the regulations made pursuant to it. As well, it requires the employer to establish a
system to manage OHS that includes the appointment of competent supervisors,
preparation of a written OHS policy, and provision of information to health and safety
representatives or joint health and safety committees. The legislation also provides for
workers to be involved in OHS management at their workplaces through a right to know
about hazards in the workplace, a right to participate through the appointment of health
and safety representatives, and a right to refuse unsafe work without the threat of
retaliation for doing so.
The Workplace Safety and Insurance Act is involved in prevention principally
through the provision of financial incentives administered through its various experience
rating plans. It used to also be involved in prevention through its supervision of safe
workplace associations and other educational and promotional activities. However,
recently, in response to recommendations from the Expert Advisory Panel on
Occupational Health and Safety, known as the Dean Report,93 these functions were
transferred to the OHS Division (OHSD) of the MOL by Bill 160 (2011).
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Since this report is focused on enforcement and compliance, these educational
and promotional aspects of the MOL’s mandate are not reviewed here, although they
are discussed in the context of best practices. The discussion of enforcement,
however, necessarily considers the management systems dimension of the OHSA
legislation since the two dimensions of the legislation cannot be separated.
Indeed, it is useful at this point to draw out a distinction between two different
kinds of regulation. On the one hand, the OHSA, and the regulations promulgated
under it, sets out specific standards that must be obeyed. For example, designated
substance regulations limit worker exposure to various harmful substances such as lead
and asbestos. These are known as specification standards. On the other hand, the
OHSA also requires employers to create or engage in certain processes to manage
OHS. A good example is the recent violence and harassment sections of the Act that
require employers to prepare policies that have a certain minimum content, conduct a
risk assessment, and provide workers with information and instruction (OHSA, Part
III.01). These are known as process standards.
The OHSA applies to nearly all provincially regulated employers and binds the
Crown (s.2). Sections of the Act also apply to independent contractors (s.4). It does
not, however, apply to work performed by the owner or occupant, or a servant of the
owner or occupant in or about a private residence (s. 3(1)). As a result, domestic
workers employed by the owner or occupant fall outside the act, a matter of some
concern given the precarious and vulnerable situation of such workers.
Unlike most employment law, the OHSA is not built on the platform of the
contract of employment. Rather, rights and duties depend on establishing a “worker”
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status. Worker is defined as “a person who performs work or supplies services for
monetary compensation” (s. 1). Also, employer is defined as a person who employs one
or more persons or contracts for the services of one or more workers, and includes a
contractor or a subcontractor who performs work or supplies services. As a result, an
employer owes the same duties to self-employed persons it hires as it does to
employees. Thus, for example, the Ontario Court of Appeal recently held that a
company that hires truck drivers as independent contractors was nevertheless required
to establish a joint health and safety committee because it regularly employed twenty or
more workers.94
Inspectors have broad powers to enforce the OHSA. They are authorized to
enter into any workplace at any time without a warrant or notice (s. 54(1)). The only
exception to this is with respect to dwellings used as workplaces. In this setting,
inspectors may only enter with the consent of the occupier or under the authority of a
warrant (s. 54(2)). Again, this exception may be significant for some precarious or
vulnerable workers who are working at home.
Once in the workplace inspectors have authority to examine and handle
equipment and materials that are present, to require production of documents, to
conduct tests, to be accompanied and assisted by experts, to require the employer to
conduct tests, etc (s. 54(1)). The inspector is also authorized to question any person
and every person must assist the inspector in the performance of her or his duties (s.
62). Where the inspection becomes an investigation into a suspected violation of the Act
because the inspector has reasonable and probable grounds to believe that an offence
has been committed, a warrant will be required and can be obtained under the act.95
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Where the inspector finds a violation of the Act, he or she has a variety of
enforcement powers. The inspector can issue an order to comply and specify either
that the order be carried out forthwith or at some specified date in the future (s. 57(1)).
The inspector may also order the employer to submit a compliance plan (s. 57(4)).
Where the inspector finds that the violation presents a danger or hazard to the safety of
a worker, he or she can issue a stop work order. Work may not be resumed until the
inspector withdraws the order after an inspection. However, work may be resumed
pending an inspection if a worker representative advises the inspector that in her or his
opinion the order has been complied with (s. 57(6-7)). Inspectors’ orders may be
appealed to the Ontario Labour Relations Board within 30 days and the Board has the
power to suspend the operation of the order pending a disposition of the appeal (s. 61).
Inspectors do not have the power to prosecute violations of the act although they
can recommend that a prosecution take place. They may, however, issue tickets under
Part I of the Provincial Offences Act (POA) for contraventions of the Act that are listed in
schedules issued pursuant to O. Reg. 950 promulgated under the POA. There is a set
fine that may be paid without a court appearance or a defendant may elect to have the
charge tried. Employers, supervisors and workers can be ticketed. The ticketing power
was substantially enlarged in 2005. Previously, tickets had been used in construction
but they now cover a much wider range of contraventions. There are now 81 ticketable
offences. Workers are the target of 30, supervisors the target of 31, and employers of
21.96 The set fine is determined by the Senior Justice of the Ontario Court of Justice.
They were last updated at the beginning of 2010. Current fines are either $195 or $295
per offence.97 Inspectors can also issue summonses under Part I for any violation of
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the OHSA. When a summons is issued, the defendant must make a court appearance
and the maximum fine on conviction is $1000.
More serious offences are prosecuted under Part III of the POA. The decision to
prosecute is made by the Legal Services Branch (LSB) of the MOL, which also
conducts the prosecution. Defendants can raise a due diligence defense but they bear
the burden of proving that they took every precaution reasonable in the circumstances
to comply with the law. Upon being convicted, an individual may be fined up to $25,000
or to a prison term of not more than 12 months, or both. A corporation may be fined up
to $500,000.
Finally, it should also be noted that employers may also be charged under the
Criminal Code. While in theory employers always could be charged with criminal
offences, such as criminal negligence, historically it had been attempted rarely and
succeeded only once.98 The enactment of the so-called Westray Bill, Bill C-45, in 2003
facilitated the prosecution of such charges. It imposes a duty on all persons “directing
the work of others” to take reasonable steps to ensure the safety of workers and the
public. It also creates new rules for attributing criminal liability to organizations,
including corporations, and identifies factors that should be used to sentence an
organization convicted of a criminal offence.
In sum, OHS law imposes enforceable duties on employers, supervisors, workers
and others to provide a safe and healthy workplace, to adopt specified OHS
management practices and to work safely. To obtain compliance with these duties,
OHS inspectors can choose from among a wide range of measures. In addition to nonstatutory mechanisms, such as providing advice and persuading, enforcement actions
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range from issuing an order to launching a criminal prosecution. The important
question, which the next section addresses, is how these powers are exercised.
B. Mapping OHS Enforcement
The translation from law on the books to law in action is crucial to the effectiveness of
any regulatory scheme, including OHS. This section examines the current practice of
OHS compliance and enforcement activities by the MOL. Before doing so, however, a
bit of background on the history of OHS enforcement is necessary since patterns of past
practice may play a role in shaping current ones.
OHS regulation has its modern roots in late nineteenth-century factory legislation.
The Ontario Factories Act was passed in 1884 and came into force 2 years later. The
Act contained special provisions regarding child and female labour, but also set general
health and safety standards for all workplaces covered by the Act. In addition to a
general duties clause, the law made provision for machine guarding, sanitation, lighting,
ventilation etc. Crucially, it also provided for the appointment of inspectors who were
empowered to enter workplaces and issue orders. Violation of the Act was an offence
punishable by fine and imprisonment.
Consistent with the practice of factory inspectors in other jurisdictions, Ontario’s
factory inspectors adopted a persuasion model of enforcement. Employers were
advised about problems in their workplaces and recommendations for improvement
were made. Prosecutions were almost never launched. Inspectors justified this
approach on the basis that it was more effective in securing compliance from employers
who were generally disposed to comply with the law. Trade unionists, however, took a
very different view, arguing that the act was not being enforced and that, as a result,
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workers were being killed and injured at alarming rates. This was especially so in the
wake of a second industrial revolution beginning in the late-nineteenth century, which
was marked by more mechanization and labour intensification.99
Without reviewing debates about the effectiveness of the persuasion strategy,
the important point here is that it became institutionally entrenched so that the default
practice of inspectors was to engage with employers in a manner that minimized
conflict. Essentially, inspectors sought to advance workplace health and safety by
providing advice and attempting to convince employers to take remedial measures.
Prosecution was a last resort and was resorted to rarely.
This institutional practice received a new impetus when OHS laws were
revamped in the late 1970s to create the legislative framework described in the previous
section. It will be recalled that among the law’s many innovations was the addition of
what is now described as an occupational health and safety management (OHSM)
approach to regulation, which required employers to adopt certain processes to create
what was then called an internal responsibility system (IRS). This existed alongside a
more traditional external responsibility system (ERS) that built on specification
standards and their enforcement.
In the years immediately following the enactment of OHSA, the government
adopted a policy of promoting the IRS with a view that the ERS would play a secondary
role, dealing with the projected minority of situations in which the IRS failed to function
effectively and, at a minimum, achieve compliance with the minimum specification
standards. As a result, inspectors were instructed to minimize the number of
enforcement actions they took and instead to get the workplace parties to work
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cooperatively through the joint health and safety committee to better address OHS
concerns and problems.100 Such an approach to inspection and enforcement was
consistent with the traditional practices of inspectors under the previous regime.
Needless to say, this approach proved to be terribly controversial and worker
OHS activists decried what they perceived to be a failure of enforcement, much in the
way their predecessors had in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century. Ontario
governments responded to this pressure in a variety of ways, including amendments to
the OHSA that more deeply institutionalized joint health and safety committees and that
increased penalties (Bill 208, S.O. 1990, c. 7.). However, it was not until the mid-1990s
that a significant change in enforcement practice was implemented, putting greater
emphasis on the ERS, entailing both more enforcement actions by the inspectors and
prosecutions for offences, especially when violations resulted in fatalities or serious
injuries.101 This pattern of practice, which still prevails, will now be described in more
detail.
There are many measures of enforcement practice. A logical way of mapping is
to start with the most basic intervention, in this case simply the fact of an inspection,
and to move up to the more assertive measures, here ending with criminal
prosecutions.
1. Inspections
As Graph 3 demonstrates, in recent years there has been an upwards trend in the
activity levels of inspectors, which has been supported by an increase in the
complement of inspectors. Between 2005 and 2010, the government doubled the
number of OHS inspectors to a total of 430.
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Graph 3. OHS Investigation and Inspections

Field activity is the broadest category and includes any visit by an inspector to a
workplace to enforce the OHSA. It includes inspections, investigations and
consultations. Inspections are a subset of field activity and include visits to monitor
compliance and to promote the IRS. These activities are proactive in that they are
planned according to criteria devised by the OHSD. By contrast, investigations are
reactive in the sense that they occur for the purpose of investigating a fatality or critical
injury, complaint or work refusal. Consultations are a small component of field activity
and have not been included in this chart.
What these data show is not only that field activity has significantly increased
over the past twenty years, but that the greatest share of this is the result of an increase
in proactive investigations. It is necessary, therefore, to say a few words about the
criteria that are used to schedule proactive investigations. It is infeasible address the
allocation criteria used over the entire 20-year period. Thus, what follows focuses on the
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most recent strategy adopted by OHSD beginning in 2005/06, which is now known as
Safe At Work Ontario.102 The OHSD has adopted a risk-based approach to regulation in
which they target workplaces for inspection based on a publicly stated set of criteria that
include:
•

injury rates and claims cost

•

compliance history

•

hazards inherent to the work

•

new businesses

•

size of business

•

specific events or incidents such as critical injuries and fatalities

•

the presence of new and/or vulnerable workers103

On the basis of these criteria, sector plans are drawn up that specify how
proactive inspection resources will be deployed. The most recent set of plans cover
2011-12. Within this context, heightened enforcement campaigns, better known as
“Safety Blitzes” are planned and announced in advance. For example, for the industrial
sector, five safety blitzes are planned for the year: new and younger workers; tower
crane suppliers; personal protective equipment; racking and storage; and
musculoskeletal disorders.104
This leads to the next question: what do inspectors do during a field visit? There
are actually no field studies that have been conducted examining the practice of
inspection and so this description is based on both documentary and statistical sources.
Inspectors are accompanied by the employer and a worker representative who is
entitled to be paid for the time spent. Where there is no worker representative, the

!

',

inspector is required by statute to consult with a “reasonable” number of workers who
are physically present (s. 54(3-5). The Act does not specify whether the inspector is to
consult with workers outside of the presence of the employer and the normal practice is
unclear.
At the end of an inspection, the inspector prepares a report that may make
recommendations and, if there are contraventions a written order to comply within a set
time frame will be issued. If there is a contravention that creates an immediate danger
to a worker or a member of the public, the inspector may issue a stop work order.
Graph 4 presents data on the frequency of these orders over the past 20 years.
Graph 4. OHS Orders

These data indicate there has been an increase in orders and stop work orders
that is consistent with the increase in inspection activity, which is evidence that the
increase in inspections is not merely cosmetic, in the sense of simply bumping up the
numbers, but that enforcement powers are being exercised during these visits, including
the stop work power which has immediate consequences to the employer.

!

(-

2. Prosecutions
Data on prosecutions is kept by the LSB, which over the years has changed the way it
records its activities. As a result, it is more difficult to construct a time series. There are
however, data from 1993 for fines and from 1997 for convictions that indicate an
increase in prosecutions and fines, particularly since 2005 (Graph 5).
Graph 5. OHS Penalties

.
The picture is nevertheless complicated because the data includes both Part I
and Part III prosecutions, which means that the numbers after 2005 are inflated by the
expansion of the ticketing system, which permits inspectors to impose on-the-spot fines
on employers, supervisors and workers. In practice, workers and supervisors receive
about 37 percent of summonses each, while employers receive 25 percent. As Garry
Gray has noted, this targeting blurs the definition of who is an OHS offender and
diffuses responsibility.105 It also has resulted in a reduction in the average fine per
conviction (Graph 6).
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Graph 6. OHS Prosecutions

Data that disaggregates Part I and Part III prosecutions have been obtained from
the LSB for 3 years, 2007/08 to 2009/10. The data show that while, on the one hand,
there has been an increase in the more serious Part III prosecutions over these years,
from 369 in 2007/08 to 445 in 2009/10, on the other, the average fine per conviction for
these more serious offences has been declined from $35,303 to $28,839.106
There has been little resort to the use of the criminal sanctions notwithstanding
the enactment of Bill C-45, which came into force in 2004. Across Canada, less than 10
criminal charges have been laid. Three criminal cases have been brought in Ontario.
The first charge criminal charge arose out of ditch collapse that killed a worker in
Newmarket, Ontario. The charge was laid in 2004 and was resolved by a plea deal in
which the criminal charge was dropped in exchange for a guilty plea to violations under
the OHS statute.107 The second criminal prosecution in Ontario was launched against
Millenium Crane, the company’s owner, and the crane operator at the time. However, in
this case too the charges were dropped after an engineering report failed to support the
prosecution’s case.108 The third prosecution, which is pending at the time of writing,
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arose out of a scaffolding collapse that killed four workers on Christmas Eve 2009. The
accused include the Metron Construction Co. and three of its officials.109
In Quebec, two cases have resulted in a conviction. In Transpavé Inc., involving
a workplace fatality, the accused pleaded guilty and was fined $110,000.00.110 The first
conviction after a trial was obtained against Pasquale Scrocca, a landscape contractor.
In that case, an employee died when the brakes on a backhoe Mr. Scrocca was driving
failed, pinning the employee against a wall. Scrocca received a conditional sentence of
imprisonment for two years less a day to be served in the community with conditions,
including a curfew.111 One case, R. v. Gagné, Steve Lemieux and Simon Gagné, ended
with an acquittal. In that case, charges were laid following a collision between a train
and a maintenance vehicle, which resulted in one death and three injuries. The two
accused individuals were employees of Québec-Cartier: Steve Lemieux, was the train
operator, and Simon Gagné, was a foreman. Justice Dionne found that the mistakes
made by the employees arose from a corporate culture of tolerance and deficient
training, not wanton and reckless disregard for the lives and safety of workers on the
part of the accused. In principle, this finding could have resulted in a conviction of the
corporation, but it had not been charged.112 There is at least one case still pending,
against Mark Hritchuk, the service manager at a car dealership, where an employee
died after catching fire due to a broken fuel pump.113
Finally, in British Columbia, the United Steel Workers launched a private
prosecution in 2010, arising out of the death of a Weyerhauser employee in British
Columbia in 2004. The company was previously assessed a penalty of nearly $300,000
by the BC compensation board. A court has ruled that the union presented enough
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evidence for the case to go forward, but the Crown subsequently intervened to
terminate the prosecution.114
Overall, the experience so far of using the Criminal Code to prosecute
corporations and individuals for OHS crimes is proving to be difficult. In Ontario, two of
the three prosecutions ended with the criminal charges being withdrawn. The third case
is still pending. Convictions have been obtained in two cases in Quebec. In the
Transpavé case, the corporation was sentenced to a fine of $100,000.00 which was
significantly higher than the maximum penalty ($20,000) then available under Quebec
health and safety law. The only jail sentence was against a small business operator who
was personally operating the equipment that caused the death. While it is possible that
the threat of criminal prosecution has a broader general deterrent effect, and may be
used to leverage guilty pleas under provincial legislation, more research would be
needed to establish whether that is so.
The analysis returns to an evaluation of the practice of OHS enforcement in
subsequent sections on best practices. However, it is worth emphasizing here that
proactive inspections, reactive inspections with prosecutions for violations that harm
workers, and workers’ voice are all strongly embedded in the enforcement regime, in
addition to voluntary compliance measures, and that although the relative importance of
each has varied over time, these features have survived through Progressive
Conservative, Liberal and New Democratic Party governments. Indeed, except perhaps
for a short period immediately after the enactment of the OHSA, a strong commitment to
state enforcement has undergirded the OHS regulation regime in Ontario.

!

('

IV. COMPARISON OF ES AND OHS ENFORCEMENT IN ONTARIO
The purpose of this brief section is to compare and contrast ES and OHS enforcement
in Ontario globally, as well as on the dimensions of proactive, reactive, and voluntary
enforcement.
A. Global Assessment
At the most general level, it is clear that OHS regulation and enforcement is far more
proactive and focused on preventing violations than ES enforcement. The latter is
largely dominated by individual complaints about violations that have occurred with a
much smaller role played by proactive inspections or other preventive measures. This
difference is manifest not just in the allocation of enforcement resources between
proactive and reactive inspections, but is also evident with respect to voluntary
enforcement. Worker voice in the ES scheme is almost exclusively a reactive voice
heard through complaints about violations that have occurred. This tendency has been
furthered by recent changes that require, in most cases, that workers first contact the
employer before an official complaint will be entertained by the MOL. The picture in
OHS regulation is different insofar as employers are required to establish a system for
managing OHS in order to prevent violations from occurring in the first instance and
workers are given a voice in the detection and correction of problems before violations
materialize or, failing that, before violations result in work injuries. Moreover, workers
are not required to first exercise their voice internally before seeking enforcement
action. They can always call an inspector.
While, on the one hand, these differences might seem to be perfectly
understandable based on the difference between wage and hour violations that, in
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principle, can be corrected by financially compensating the worker, compared to health
and safety hazards that might materialize in death and disablement for which financial
compensation can never be adequate. On the other hand, the differences can also be
overstated. Workers who experience ES violations, especially ones that persist over
time, may suffer losses to the quality of their lives and the lives of those who depend on
their incomes that are not fully redressed even if full compensation is paid retroactively.
Enforcement of a minimum floor of ES standards is central to labour market regulation.
Further, as the Ontario provincial government recognizes in its Poverty Reduction
Strategy, ES are key to creating fair wages and working conditions and reducing
poverty.115 For these and other reasons, including advancement of the broader
principles of decent work, social minima, universality, and fairness, the prevention of ES
violations is also an important public policy goal that currently is not being pursued to
nearly the same extent that it is in OHS regulation.
Although the best practices section to follow returns to this theme, in a report for
a project on vulnerable workers, it is also important to emphasize that this group of
workers is most dependent on a strong, state-centred regime for the enforcement of
their rights, whether it be in the realm of ES or OHS. Voluntary compliance is less likely
to succeed in an environment in which workers are least likely to know their rights and
most vulnerable to retaliation or its threat, even when retaliation is unlawful. For the
same reasons, reactive enforcement in response to complaints is also less effective for
vulnerable workers. Proactive enforcement, supplemented by meaningful participation
by worker organizations so that workers’ voices can be heard in the regulatory regime,
is essential.
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B. Voluntary Compliance
Substantial reliance is placed on voluntary compliance in ES and OHS regulation in the
sense that both systems are built around the assumption that most employers are
motivated to obey the law and have the capacity to do so, especially if they are provided
with a modest level of compliance assistance by the MOL or other agencies.
In the case of ES, the MOL provides information to both employers and
employees through phone, email, and its website. The more important innovation,
however, has been the addition of a requirement that workers who believe they have
suffered an ES violation first attempt to resolve the matter with their employer before an
ES complaint will be accepted by the MOL. Clearly, the objective is to encourage
workers to become more self-reliant, give employers the chance to correct errors when
they are pointed out to them, and to reduce the flow of complaints to employment
standards officers.
In the context of OHS, voluntary compliance is not only a major goal, but it is one
that is supported by a much broader range of institutional arrangement than is the case
in ES. Not only does the MOL provide information, the law requires the establishment
of internal responsibility systems that involve training, information sharing, worker
participation, etc. As well, for many years the workers’ compensation system had a
mandate to improve accident prevention which it did in a variety of ways, not the least of
which was to fund safe workplace organizations that provided information, training and
support around OHS issues. Recently, the prevention mandate was shifted to the MOL
and is overseen by a Prevention Council and a Chief Prevention Officer.
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Workers are also supposed to play a major role in the voluntary enforcement
system, not only by working safely themselves, but by being given a voice in the internal
responsibility system to participate in hazard identification and the development of firmlevel OHS policies and practices. It is notable, however, that although in the early
1980s the MOL sought to force worker concerns to be run through the IRS before it
would act, that policy has long since been abandoned so that it is no longer the case
that the MOL will only initiate enforcement activities after it has been demonstrated that
the worker cannot resolve the matter directly with the employer.
C. Reactive Enforcement
As has been noted, beyond supporting voluntary compliance, reactive enforcement is
the principle strategy for addressing ES violations. Moreover, reactive enforcement is
generally limited to responding to the specific complaint of the employee. Curiously, the
MOL abandoned the strategy of treating a complaint as being good evidence of more
systemic problems and launching a broader investigation of ES compliance at firms
where employees were registering complaints. This has had the result of eliminating a
good risk-based technique for identifying areas where the investment of enforcement
resources is likely to produce significant benefit to at-risk workers. In general, the
inspection process follows a pyramid-based approach in which the majority of
complaints are settled without further administrative action, with a decreasing number
being resolved by the use of stronger enforcement measures, including orders and
prosecutions for non-compliance.
In the area of OHS, more resources are invested in proactive enforcement than
in reactive measures and this trend has been growing for some time. Reactive

!

(+

enforcement results in a range of measures being taken when violations are detected,
from the provision of advice to issuing compliance orders, issuing stop work orders,
provincial offence prosecutions and, rarely, criminal charges. As in ES, there is an
enforcement pyramid with the more serious sanctions being reserved for a smaller and
smaller number of instances as the seriousness of the violation and resulting harms
increases.
D. Proactive Enforcement
As noted above, OHS enforcement places a far greater emphasis on proactive
measures than ES enforcement. This is true notwithstanding that in response to an
auditor general’s report in 2004 the ES branch increased the number of proactive
inspections. Both branches target proactive inspections using measures that identify
areas where non-compliance is likely to be above the norm. Proactive inspections in
both areas result in a range of enforcement actions, from providing advice and
encouragement at the bottom of the pyramid to issuance of compliance orders and
tickets. Interestingly, the pyramid of enforcement measures arising from a proactive ES
inspection seems to be higher than in OHS inspections, which rarely go beyond orders
and tickets.
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V. Best Practices from Outside Ontario
Thus far this report has demonstrated the limitations of Ontario’s ES and OHS
enforcement regimes. The next step in developing appropriate policy recommendations
involves considering practices outside Ontario.
A. Employment Standards Enforcement
The overarching critique of the ES enforcement regime herein relates to its reactive
emphasis with limited use of proactive measures as well as complementary ‘softer’
measures focusing on voluntary compliance through self-regulation. Recall that
proactive enforcement is an approach aimed at preventing violations, that is, in the first
instance heavily reliant on inspections and expanded investigations when violations are
detected.116 In turn, reactive enforcement is a strategy aimed at providing redress for
workers dependent upon complaints to trigger regulatory intervention. Finally, voluntary
compliance is a strategy of self-regulation involving largely education and promotion in
the first instance and negotiated settlements when complaints arise.117
Despite this critique of the reactive focus of ES enforcement, it is important to
acknowledge that almost all regulatory regimes use a mix of hard law, soft law (e.g.,
employer awareness programs and self-regulatory techniques), economic incentives,
worker participation, etc. and that this will continue to be the reality. The crucial
question is how these strategies are best combined to improve the quality of
enforcement (i.e., to maximize the effectiveness of investigations and inspections,
penalties and settlements, and the voice118 of those affected): which ‘mixed’ models of
enforcement have been found to be effective and which models have been found to be
ineffective? Furthermore, what innovative community-based practices aimed at
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improved enforcement exist outside Ontario, including those in which workers’
advocates and unions play an active role in documenting and redressing violations?
This section addresses these questions by surveying the research literature and
government reports covering best practices in ES in Australia, the United Kingdom, and
the United States, as well as in other Canadian jurisdictions.119 It does so against the
backdrop of problems identified with Ontario’s ES enforcement regime highlighted in
earlier in this paper, in particular the four foremost concerns identified in the 2004 report
of Ontario’s Auditor General (several of which were reiterated in its 2006 report): first,
the limited number of proactive inspections undertaken by the Ministry despite its
commitment to conduct them;120 second, the lack of extended investigations121 of
substantiated claims to “cover other employees of the same employer to determine
whether additional violations had taken place”122 ; third, the failure to prosecute many
such repeat offending employers;123 and, fourth, the weaknesses in the collection of
amounts in default owed to employee claimants by employers.124
In identifying best practices, the analysis is also attentive to other limits of
reactive ES enforcement regimes identified in the research literature pertinent to the
Ontario case. Such shortcomings encompass, in the area of investigations and
inspections, the outmoded nature of ES enforcement regimes with respect to the growth
of subcontracting, specifically, the dearth of measures to address the dynamics of
supply chains, especially enforcement in small firms operating at the bottom of these
chains,125 the infeasibility of achieving comprehensive coverage within a geographicallyfocused inspectorate since it requires inspectors to cover an inordinate amount of
ground,126 , the relative inattention to high-risk industries,127 the lack of offices of a
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workers’ advocate in most jurisdictions,128 and the limited interagency collaboration in
sharing information pertinent to the detection of violations.129 In the area of penalties
and settlements, deficiencies commonly identified include the tendency towards minimal
penalties or sanctions; this shortcoming relates both to the relatively low level of
settlements workers typically receive (i.e., settlements below those statutorily required
as a consequence of the mediation process) and, in the case of Ontario, as elsewhere,
to the fact that employers “benefit from ‘voluntary compliance’ [of this sort] … because it
keeps their violation off the enforcement track,” meaning that they are unlikely subjects
of extended investigations in instances where they might occur, nor are they required to
pay fines and administrative fees accompanying orders issued.130 Finally, in the area of
voice, countless studies point to the failure to provide for third party involvement in the
enforcement process in most contexts, that is, from complaints procedures to
investigative activities and settlements processes.131
A range of best practices from other jurisdictions are noteworthy in responding to
problems associated with a principally old style reactive regime. Consistent with the
goal of cultivating an effective ‘mixed model’, in what follows these best practices are
divided by those that are proactive, reactive, and voluntary.
1. Proactive Practices
The greatest number of promising initiatives for replication fall in the proactive grouping,
most of which relate to investigations and inspections and to voice. Many such
initiatives emanate from the United States, where a great deal of experimentation is
taking place in the context of low rates of unionization, and Australia, a context in which
workers have confronted decollectivization in the last few decades, partly via the
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centralization of industrial relations, and the import of a North American style enterprise
bargaining, cultivating greater reliance on ES as the main source of protection.
(i) Investigations and Inspections
With regard to investigations and inspections, a growing body of literature points
to the importance of targeting high-risk industries and within these industries structures
at the top. Weil characterizes this strategy as critical to ‘strategic enforcement’ that
applies four criteria to enforcement decisions – prioritization (i.e., choosing sectors
carefully based on where intervention will have a high impact given factors such as the
known level of violation and the vulnerability of the workers), deterrence (i.e., the threat
of investigation), sustainability (i.e., the possibility of avoiding repeat offences), and
system wide impacts – and he illustrates its effectiveness in several sectors
characterized by large pyramidal structures (i.e., garment, fast food and hotels).132
Responding partly to the impetus for change coming from Weil’s research
findings, the Wages and Hours Division (WHD) of the U.S. Department of Labor began
to embrace strategic enforcement in its activities under the Obama administration by
ramping up inspections, increasing funding, and, most importantly, establishing a new
plan/prevent/protect departmental orientation which it describes as follows:
“[b]ased on the principle that employers and others must “find and fix” violations
– that is, assure compliance – before a DOL investigator arrives at the
workplace. Employers and others in the Department’s regulated communities
must understand that the burden is on them to obey the law, not the DOL to
catch them violating the law. This principle is at the heart of this new DOL
worker protection strategy. DOL is going to replace “catch me if you can” with
Plan/Prevent/Protect.”133
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Through this strategy, the DOL is targeting “fissured industries” in which “employment
decisions have been devolved from major employers to a complex network of smaller
employers... typically operat[ing] in more competitive markets,”134 specifically the
hospitality, janitorial, construction, and agricultural sectors, for large enforcement
sweeps as well as educative campaigns.
For example, in 2011, the Department initiated an enforcement sweep focusing
on the bottom of the fissured pyramid of production in the agricultural industry,
beginning in South Florida and continuing up the Eastern Coast of the U.S., to increase
compliance and inform workers of their rights under the Migrant and Seasonal
Agricultural Worker Protection Act (MSAWPA), the Fair Labor Standards Act (FSLA),
and the Occupational Safety and Health Act’s Field Sanitation Standard.135 Under this
initiative, by June, it had conducted over 20 investigations, recovered $670,770 in back
wages for approximately 600 agricultural workers, and assessed over $128,850 in
penalties, finding violations such as “paying workers less than the federal minimum
wage, and paying workers at packing sheds who did not qualify for the FLSA’s
agricultural exemption ‘straight time’ for all hours worked, rather than time and one-half
their regular rates of pay for overtime work hours as required.”136 This sweep involved
sending teams of investigators to fields and packing houses to assess compliance by
“facility owners, growers, farm labor contractors and all other business entities
associated with these agricultural operations. Thorough inspections of transportation,
field sanitation facilities, employment practices and pay records [were] conducted to
ensure compliance with all applicable child labor and agricultural labor standards.”137
Additionally, the Department undertook surveillance activities involving interviewing
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workers at key sites, with numerous investigators covering large geographies on the
same day and involving departmental lawyers early in preparing cases for future
litigation.138
On a smaller scale, there are jurisdictions in Canada beyond Ontario that report
conducting proactive inspections. It is questionable as to whether they are of the calibre
of best practices, as there is little evidence of either an industry or a geographic focus in
any. For example, although they give complete discretion to the Director over the
enforcement programs insofar as their implementation, Manitoba (S. 123 (1)) initiates
proactive inspections against certain employers139 and New Brunswick (S. 58 (1))
conducts audits at random.140 Newfoundland and Labrador’s Labour Standards Act also
includes powers of entry and inspection (S. 64) and engages in what it calls
“preventative intervention,” where ESOs visit workplaces to meet informally with
employers and employees to discuss their rights and responsibilities under provincial
legislation141 These visits may be random or target certain employers or industries
where non-compliance is evident.
More innovative in their form, legislative measures introducing a ‘positive duty’ for
employers to prevent illegal workplace practices are also emerging elsewhere. At
present, positive duty provisions are most developed in anti-discrimination law in
contexts such as the United Kingdom. However, scholars such as Linda Dickens argue
that this notion could be used to improve ES enforcement.142 Taking such suggestions
forward, positive duty provisions are also the main feature of the new model national
OHS Bill scheduled to come into effect in Australia (in January 2012), and they require
more out of employers in terms of due diligence in health and safety matters than in the
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past; specifically, these preventative measures hold employers more rigorously
accountable for preventing violations (i.e., for compliance).143 Notably, the Australian
model law also has a wide definition of employers, which includes “officer[s]” of
“person[s] conducting ...business[s] or undertaking[s],” encompassing a broader range
of individuals exercising influence in shaping workplace terms and conditions –
individuals in various locations in the sub-contracting chain, etc. – rather than an
employer-employee relationship, narrowly defined.144 In its attempt to respond to
fissures in employment structure and industries, this model national OHS Bill’s inclusion
of a broad range of workplace actors in the model law constitutes an emerging best
practice.
Elements of yet another preventative measure operational in the U.S. are also
pertinent to this survey as it covers a crucial high-risk industry in which subcontracting is
central: namely, the ‘hot cargo’ (S. 15(a)) provision of the FSLA whereby the WHD uses
the threat of embargoing goods manufactured in the garment sector below minimum
ES. The hot cargo provision was underutilized in a period in which large inventories
were common and shipments arrived infrequently. With the arrival of just-in-time
production, and its corollary (i.e., a growing pyramid of fissured production and the
proliferation of small enterprises in this sector), the WHD revived it to pursue direct
agreements with manufacturers after they have faced an embargo of their goods due to
a violation of the FLSA at one of the subcontractors responsible for assembly work;
manufacturers therefore enter into monitoring arrangements as a result of enforcement
commenced by an investigator. These arrangements cover a variety of practices
including the provision of information, agreements to observe minimum standards, and
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periodic compliance inspections and they cover all of the manufacturer’s clients, present
and future. Agreements also require manufacturers to take timely action to rectify
violations on the part of its contractors both by ensuring that back wages are paid in
cases where non-payment of wages are discovered and by notifying the WHD of such a
finding. Furthermore, they can be revoked at any time if the WHD finds the
manufacturer to be in contravention.145 While the hot cargo provision has a voluntary
cast, in that it leads to monitoring of small firms at the bottom of the contracting
hierarchy by the manufacturers at the top (or the brand names) rather than state
inspectors directly, it is proactive in the sense that it anticipates violations in high-risk
sectors as well as recidivism. In this way, its goals resemble measures undertaken
elsewhere (e.g., in Australia) to protect garment workers that effectively treat them (e.g.,
via deeming) as employees of contractors and/or manufacturers for whom the directly
produce goods and services.146
Other best practices related to investigations respond to the call for collaboration
between various agencies of government in the detection of violations. One concrete
example of such collaboration is New York State’s Joint Enforcement Task Force on
Employee Misclassification operating since 2007.147 This Taskforce was created in
recognition of the fiscal burden that misclassified workers put on not only workers but
the state (i.e., the revenue loss for the state and its agencies). It involves
representation from the state Departments of Labor and Taxation and Finance, the
Workers’ Compensation Board, the Fraud Inspector General, the State Attorney
General and the Comptroller of the City of New York, who proactively engage in
enforcement sweeps, coordinated assignments, and systematic referrals and data
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sharing to recover lost wages and government revenue. As a result of its efforts,
between 2007 and 2010, the Taskforce identified “50,000 instances of employee
misclassification and discovered over $704 million in unreported wages” leading to the
assessment of “$21.5 million in unemployment taxes and over $1.85 million in
unemployment insurance fraud penalties, over $16.5 million in unpaid wages, and over
$2.3 million in workers compensation fines and penalties”. 148 Initially, joint enforcement
sweeps revealing that the construction industry was fraught with violations resulted in a
noteworthy initiative: a new law, known as the New York State Construction Industry
Fair Play Act, which took effect in Fall 2010. The legislation is designed to curb
misclassification by creating a presumption of employment in the construction industry
unless an employer can meet a three factor test.149 The law also provides new penalties
for employers who fail to classify their employees properly (Fair Play Act s. 861(e)).150
(ii) Voice
With respect to the ability of workers’ and their organizations to shape enforcement
processes and thus exercise control over their conditions of employment, or their voice,
a number of innovative community-based practices aimed at improved enforcement
also exist in which workers’ advocates and unions are involved in documenting and
redressing violations. Some such initiatives are institutionalized, such as the Los
Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD) and Board of Public Workers Deputization
Programs (LABPW), documented by Fine and Gordon.151 Under the first program, the
LAUSD deputizes and trains business representatives of building trades unions to
enforce the prevailing wage on district projects funded by monies from construction
bonds. These representatives are known as “work preservation volunteers”, are
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provided with badges and business cards, and are authorized to enter school sites to
conduct what are effectively compliance visits. The program emanated from a
controversial agreement in which construction unions conceded their right to strike over
job issues in exchange for the creation of an internal compliance department set up by
the LAUSD in which union representatives play this role. With its establishment, the
LABPW followed suit, training what it calls compliance group representatives. Both
programs are designed to make these on-the-ground inspectors the representatives of
labour inspectors from the City and thereby expand their enforcement capacity, as is the
case with the hot cargo provision of the FSLA. Agents’ duties thus include interviewing
employees about hours, wages, job classification, official duties, and problems at work
more generally. They also assist workers in filling out forms in the complaint process
(i.e., when the perceive violations through their investigatory efforts); but they do not
determine violations or assess penalties. Both well established programs,
representatives are retrained every year. They are also informed regularly that they are
not permitted to use their activities to gather information for their unions, disparage nonunion contractors, or review project data outside a pending complaint.
These examples represent the strongest version of Fine and Gordon’s152 call for
community based enforcement (i.e., enabling civil society groups to deliver information
and education, patrol communities, file and investigate complaints, and provide for
ongoing deterrents), which has its roots in a failed provision of the FLSA. Specifically,
when the FLSA was being drafted, there was an attempt to secure a fair labour
standards board to work with enlightened employers and unions to help police
sweatshop employment relationships; but the provision never materialized. Instead, a
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weak judicial body emerged and the U.S. Congress effectively banned unions from
bringing class actions under the FLSA.153 Like this failed vision for the fair labour
standards board, as these authors assert, the strength of such programs include their
relative permanence and that they are enshrined in public law rather than operating as a
program of a particular administration. Although it is difficult to assess their impact on
the nature and degree of violations of ES, these programs also follow Weil’s154
prescription for regulatory jujitsu as their substantive success flows from the business
representatives’ intimate understanding of sector-based issues, the “contour” of their
activities to specific rules applicable to public construction, and their access to detailed
data.
Although it is less institutionalized, another example of community based
enforcement where workers gain voice is the Maintenance Cooperation Trust Fund
(MCTF), a janitorial watchdog involving a California local of the SEIU (Local 1877) and
lead contractors engaged in collective agreements with that local. Together, these
institutions established a trust fund whose mission is to abolish unfair business
practices in this industry through education as well as investigating cleaning contractors
conditions to enhance enforcement by public agencies and private attorneys.155
Signatory contractors pay between 1 and 5 cents per hour worked by workers to fund
such programs, which require a staff of seven to cover the California area. This staff
exposes, persuades, and will ultimately sue violators if they refuse to change. It also
helps state agencies with fact finding, brings workers to agencies to follow up, and also
supports workers engaged in private litigation. As part of its activities, the MCTF enters
monitoring agreements with troublesome contractors and helps cultivate interagency
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monitoring.156 The main limitations of its activities, compared to the preceding
examples, are twofold: first, firms can always choose alternative contractors whereas
more traditional justice for janitors campaigns target worksites, and thus building
tenants must comply with monitoring agreements rather than firms. Second, the MCTF
is not capable of making lasting change inside state agencies.
Still another example of this community based enforcement holds the promise of
responding to this criticism: the New York Wage and Hours Watch, a relatively new
formal partnership between New York’s labour department and six agencies including
workers’ centres and unions. This arrangement involves a memorandum of agreement
signed in 2009 in which the participating organizations agree to identify and train at
least six people to serve as wage and hour watch members for two years. In this
capacity, these individuals, who are not deputized, provide at least 200 businesses per
year with labour-law compliance information and hold sessions for the public and refer
potential labour law violations to the labour department but they are not authorised to
carry out inspections; they essentially function like “neighbourhood watch” applied to
labour standards such that the chief strength of the model they follow is the ongoing
partnerships between the state enforcement bureaucracy and community groups. As
Fine and Gordon157 suggest, to be effective, however, such collaborations must have
clear terms of reference regarding the scope of decision-making, funding to enable
community participation, and retain a strong enforcement role for the state.158
2. Reactive Approaches
As elsewhere in the United States, Australia, the UK, and other jurisdictions in Canada,
Ontario’s ES enforcement system is designed such that there will always been
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individual complaints. Permitting, and even encouraging, complaints from individual
workers is acceptable in accordance with the starting principles of decent work,
fairness, access to social minima and universality so long as both a better balance is
achieved between reactive and proactive approaches and resources dedicated to
complaints procedures are used wisely. For example, the MOL’s goal of eliminating the
backlog in unresolved claims described in Section II is laudable. However, a
quantitative approach to achieving this goal by seeking expedited settlements below
legislated minima is out of step with the justice principle, that is, the quality of
settlements, defined in terms of appropriate levels of penalties and effective collections
for individual violators and more broadly in terms of Weil’s strategic enforcement pillars
of deterrence and prioritization (i.e., individual investigations should aim to be high
impact in their effects).
(i) Investigations and Inspections
In recognition of the fact that, in Tucker’s159 helpful characterization, “most workers are
unlikely to be assertive protagonists” – i.e., it is unreasonable to depend on workers as
whistleblowers, particularly in the context of high levels of precariousness in labour
markets such as Ontario, as documented in another report prepared for this initiative160
– permitting anonymous complaints is a best practice reactive approach in the area of
investigations and inspections. Such is the case in Saskatchewan where the MOL offers
a complaint option that allows employees to anonymously submit complaints and
evidence against an employer who the Compliance and Review Unit then investigates.
This option is available if the worker is still “employed at [the] workplace; believes that
the Labour Standards Act is not being followed and would like the situation to be
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corrected but does not: but, does not want to file a formal complaint.” Under such
circumstances, only written complaints with supporting evidence are reviewed. The
Compliance and Review Unit also pursues expanded investigations in many such
instances; specifically,where a claim submitted by a worker is found to apply to more
than one worker at the worksite, the Ministry will expand their inspection to protect all
workers present.161 Anonymous complaints are also accepted in six labor agencies in
the United States; Colorado, New Jersey, California, Connecticut, Illinois, and New
York.162
(ii) Penalties and Settlements
With respect to penalties and settlements, two best practices from the U.S. are
instructive. The first is found in the State of California, where a section of the Labour
Code, colloquially known as the “brother’s keeper” law holds user firms in certain low
wage industries responsible for subcontractors wage and hours violations under a duty
based regime.163 This law provides that “a person or entity may not enter into a contract
or agreement for labor or services with a construction, farm labor, garment, janitorial, or
security guard contractor, where the person or entity knows or should know that the
contract or agreement does not include funds sufficient to allow the contractor to comply
with all the applicable, local state, and federal laws or regulations governing the labor or
services.”164 In other words, if a contracting firm is negligent by failing to uncover and
limit employment law violations apparent from its contractual arrangements with labour
suppliers, it can be held responsible.165 Resembling the hot cargo provision of the
FLSA, but applicable to a greater number of industries, the aim of the law is to deter
purchasers from entering into labour supply arrangements that are, by their financial
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terms, likely to lead to labour standards violations and more specifically to encourage
manufacturers to have contractors put agreements in writing.166 In such ways, this law
could be characterized as a proactively-oriented reactive measure as it attempts to
prevent violations from occurring, distinguishing it from provisions the limited for joint
and several liability in Ontario’s ESA, which are more genuinely reactive (e.g., those
applied to temporary help agencies and their clients).167 However, since the brother’s
keeper law’s teeth only come into play after violations have occurred and have been
revealed and since it does not necessitate monitoring agreements of the sort mandated
by the WHD under the hot cargo provision, it falls in the reactive category.168
Spreading across the United States in the last few years, a second area of best
practices encompasses Wage Theft Bills, a cluster of policies designed to enforce
minimum wage, overtime and other wage related labour standards where cities and
states play a central role in “scaling up” struggles for improved enforcement.169 This
strategy emerged principally through community campaigns responding to the fact that
over a dozen U.S. states had minimum wage and overtime protections superior to
federal law. They then gradually came to involve counties and states, via the creation
of Wage Theft Laws, in the prosecution of wage violations, including, among other
things, the collection of extensive damages on behalf of workers, charging employers
that violate the law the full cost of administrative proceedings, and revoking the
operating licenses of known violators. One success story is found in the county of
Miami-Dade, Florida which passed the first county wide ordinance in the U.S. Adopted
in February 2010, this ordinance outlaws wage theft and provides the county with the
ability to intervene in the recovery of back wages for workers who have experienced
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violations.170 Specifically, it provides for triple damages to be paid to workers and
requires the violator to pay the administrative costs of claims, as well as damages. In
this way, it responds to the concern that mediated settlements are inadequate by
bolstering the level of back wages awarded, puts more pressure on collections, and
removes the frequent requirement on workers and their representatives for covering
administrative fees in the complaints process. Although the system of regulation differs
in Canada, where only approximately ten per cent of the workforce is covered by the
federal labour code and where ES in the area of wages vary province, the use of levers
at the local level to improve enforcement in this U.S. case is the key lesson.
(iii) Voice
In the arena of voice, under Australia’s Fair Work Act (2008), which sets out ten new
national ES, unions have the right to bring court proceedings in relation to violations of
ES if they are entitled to represent the employee in question.171 If the violation relates
to a workplace agreement (akin to a collective agreement Canadian-style) or workplace
determination that binds the union, the union can also make an application in its own
right, on behalf of an employee, or both.172 This limited space for unions amounts to a
degree of third party involvement in the enforcement process. It should be emphasized,
however, that this example only represents an improvement when compared to the
system operating under Australia’s former ‘Work Choices’ regime since union rights
under the new centralized system of industrial relations remain more constrained than
two decades ago when they were considerably stronger in most states.
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3. Voluntary Approaches
The research literature, including studies on OHS and ES, documents the limits of
voluntary measures, especially when they are the exclusive means of enforcement.173 It
highlights the need to begin with the acknowledgment of the inherent power imbalance
between workers and employers and the related recognition that this imbalance is
amplified with globalization and the fissuring of production processes,174 especially the
growth of subcontracting etc. not only in the private but the public sector. Considered on
its own terms, there are nevertheless several best practices in voluntary compliance,
which essentially amounts to the implementation of regimes of corporate social
responsibility (CSR) (encompassing, among other examples, social labelling – or
verification systems for a firm’s social performance by authorizing the use of a physical
label to communicate the social conditions surrounding production – and codes of
conduct – a written set of standards, principles and norms to which a firm conforms)175
that could potentially complement innovative proactive and reactive strategies in the
context of a proactively-oriented mixed regime.176 These practices relate principally to
investigations and inspections.
(i) Investigations and Inspections
Considering concrete best practices in voluntarism (narrowly defined), with regard to
investigations and inspections, the Fair Labor Association (FLA) is one model applied
globally in which brand names commit themselves to a regime of private monitoring.
Specifically, these entities, including their entire chain of suppliers, agree to a
programme of implementing a code of conduct, internal monitoring, and unannounced
independent external monitoring of standards. The model emerged in response to the
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fact that the traditional CRS measures concentrating on auditing fail to address the root
causes of non-compliance; in response, it integrates a system of monitoring,
rectification and third party complaints. The FLA was formed in 1999 and involves
sixteen brand names and is administered by a coalition of benevolent firms, university
groups, and NGOs from around the world. It covers 4,000 facilities in eighty countries.
The names covered by the model thus implement the FLA principles which are
equivalent to the core labour standards of the ILO, conduct internal monitoring, submit
to third party audits by FLA accredited auditors in a random sample of 5 percent of their
suppliers as well as to publishing the results of these audits on the FLA website after
the company has the opportunity to take remedial action, and report to the public on
various activities.177
A distinctive best practice in voluntary compliance oriented to the public rather
than the private sector, and of growing popularity among unions, union centrals,
employers and states,178 is public procurement policy – agreements that government
agencies investing “tax dollars” make with private sector actors in procuring public
works projects. Such agreements exist in a range of contexts and at different scales,
including in Toronto, whose policy is longstanding. A noteworthy national example is
Ireland’s Public Sector Procurement Policy, which seeks to “maintain employment
standards in the public sector and uphold statutory norms, notably in relation to
construction companies tendering for and engaging in public work contracts.”179 This
new agreement calls for adhering to “industry norms in terms of pay and conditions and
to prevailing national and/or industry-wide agreements, including health and safety
regulations,” as well as to “employment standards and statutory norms, including those
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regarding wage levels, while also ensuring competitive tendering and value for
money.”180 It is administered by the Department of Finance, which issues public
procurement guidelines, and is promoted by a range of other government agencies,
including local government and transport agencies. Under its terms, contracting
authorities are also to facilitate access to the Labour Relations Commission Conciliation
Service, Labour Court and the Rights Commissioner Service (e.g., in the event of an
industrial dispute) in line with Ireland’s industrial relations regime181
Another national example is the umbrella group known as the Sweatfree
Purchasing Consortium, a group of state and local governments in the U.S. who help
other cities, states, counties, towns, and school districts to develop and implement
policies and rules towards the goal of avoiding sweatshop products. The Consortium
works to assist governments in creating codes of conduct, applicable to the contracts in
which they engage, requiring that their contractors, abide by “standards that enjoy
international consensus and the will of the people of the nation and region of
production,” specifically, the core conventions of the ILO and its Declaration on
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and its implementation and monitoring.182
The Consortium also provides guidelines for a five step program for the monitoring of
such Codes involving: advertising (i.e., public entities are to conduct “targeted
advertising campaign[s] to declare their intent to allocate public funds to purchase
goods and services that are produced in safe, fair and humane working conditions;”183
prequalification, which involves requiring or encouraging vendors to agree, in advance
of making a bid, to conform to the public entity’s code of conduct; a process equivalent
to certification, which involves requiring bidders that have not fulfilled the
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prequalification requirement to attest through various means that they will subscribe to
the code of conduct in question (e.g., documentation may be required to prove that
suppliers related to the bidder are required by the bidder to conform to the Code);
supplier evaluation, a process in which the advisory team to the Code verifies the
vendors’ capacities to comply with its terms (i.e., before an award is made); and,
performance monitoring, which entails setting out “specific steps to ensure code
compliance and responsible supply chain management throughout the duration of the
contract as a condition for contract continuation and/or renewal.”184
Still other vehicles of voluntary compliance involve more focussed partnerships
between state agencies and industry. One example is the Horticultural Industry Shared
Compliance Program, involving the Australia’s Fair Work Ombudsman, horticultural
industry employers and state agencies in a large-scale attempt to remedy the high level
of violations in this sector.185 This program adheres to a three stage program of
activities, which includes, first, developing a joint publication operating as an employer
guide to the Horticultural Award; second, planning for compliance, specifically
circulating educational resources to and hosting seminars for employers about
employment regulations for the purposes of self-audits and informing them of audit
phases of the program; and, third, auditing a randomly selected group of employers
towards a nationwide audit. This program is, however, highly voluntary since, at the
third stage, even when violations were found, the Fair Work Inspectors work with
employers to encourage voluntary compliance rather than pursuing prosecutions.186
Another example, also operating in Australia, is the “Proactive Compliance Deed”
between McDonald’s Australia and the Commonwealth of Australia.”187 In this

!

*,

agreement, which is technically between Fair Work Australia, the federal body
responsible for the enforcement of ES, and McDonald’s, the latter agrees to follow a
national self-audit program to ensure that it is complying with relevant labour laws,
especially those related to wage payments. This self-audit covers ten per cent of all
employees at twenty-seven McDonald’s restaurants and it requires the company to
disclose and rectify each contravention found.
Based on these types of examples and their successes and failures, other
researchers also call for ‘softer’ techniques of investigation and inspection to
supplement ‘hard laws’, particularly in what Teague refers to as “Anglo-Saxon” contexts.
These techniques include diagnostic monitoring, which uses inspection as a
comprehensive review of arrangements and a means of examining reasons beyond
non-compliance without the threat of rectification off the bat, and specialized institutions
(for example, the UK’s Low Pay Commission) designed to educate the public on
employment regulations.188 For such authors, integrating these arrangements into
labour codes offers the potential of broadening enforcement beyond single agencies,
and hence a more holistic approach that could be combined effectively with proactive
measures in contexts like Ireland, where the principle of rectification is relatively
unsuccessful in addressing the standard setting behaviour of forms. Such techniques
could be combined with existing strategies of naming violators on government websites
to improve compliance over the long term, as is common in several jurisdictions in
Canada, including Ontario.189 Yet the power of voluntary measures, even those ‘best
practices’, is not compelling, unless they are combined with harder and more proactive
measures of enforcement.
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B. OHS Enforcement
Building on the framework for discussion of best practices in ES, this section addresses
best practices in OHS enforcement through the lenses of proactive approaches,
reactive approaches, and voluntary approaches. Clearly, there are very substantial
differences between the ES and the OHS enforcement regimes, not just in Ontario but
in most of the industrialized world. Proactive enforcement and worker voice are much
better institutionalized in the OHS regime than they are in ES, as are voluntary
approaches. One reason for this is that a vibrant worker OHS movement in the 1970s
and 1980s was able to pressure governments and employers to address OHS issues
much more aggressively and proactively than they had in the past, and to accord
workers and their unions a voice both at the policy and the workplace levels. Therefore,
the discussion of best practices in OHS begins from a different baseline than in ES.
1. Proactive Enforcement
(i)Inspections
There is widespread agreement on the principle of risk-based regulation. This requires
regulators to allocate their enforcement resources on the basis of an assessment of the
risks that a firm or a sector (however defined) pose to the regulator’s objectives.190 In
the context of OHS regulation, where the overall objective is to prevent occupational
deaths, injuries and diseases, an assessment must be made of the inherent risks posed
by an activity and the competence and commitment of firms to mitigate those risks.191
The strategic enforcement model developed by Weil192 described earlier operates
according to similar principles.
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The importance of proactive inspection as a best practice cannot be understated
and, as evident in Section III, the OHSD has emphasized this dimension of its
enforcement activities in recent years. As well, the OHSD has gone some way toward
the adoption of best practices in setting priorities for its proactive enforcement program,
by taking into account injury rates and claims cost, compliance history, inherent
hazards, new businesses, size and the presence of new and/or vulnerable workers. A
strong word of caution, however, should be registered about the use of workers’
compensation data in setting priorities. Numerous studies have shown that the use of
claims cost data to experience rate firms in workers’ compensation produces strong
incentives for employers to engage in aggressive claims management that may alter the
claims data without addressing the underlying OHS conditions that result in work
injuries193 As a result, workers’ compensation data is an unreliable indicator of the
capacity and commitment of firms to manage their health and safety and the data is
likely to become even less reliable to the extent that it becomes known that it is used for
targeting enforcement resources. It is notable that the Dean Report has called for the
development of a common database to measure leading rather than lagging indicators
for the purpose of assessing risk and measuring performance.194 The development of
such a database would provide a much firmer foundation for establishing proactive
inspection priorities.
The use of safety blitzes or targeted safety campaigns has also been identified
as a best practice for risk-based regulation and has been used in Sweden, Australia, the
UK and Quebec195 and, as noted above, is being used in Ontario. The literature also
suggests that there needs to be a linkage between the results of a safety blitz inspection
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and subsequent proactive enforcement activities. In particular, where a safety blitz
inspection or, for that matter, a regular proactive inspection detects a violation, the
result should not just be an order to address the particular problem, rather the finding
should trigger a broader review of the employer’s management system to understand
how and why the violation occurred and was not corrected prior to the inspection and to
take steps for this to be corrected. This “bottom-up” approach196 avoids isolating
particular problems or incidents from the bigger picture, as well as from higher levels of
management who need to be made to understand that it is their responsibility to institute
good OHS management practices in the firm. It is not clear from the documentation
whether Ontario follows this best practice.
This raises a larger question about the conduct of inspections and the actions
taken when OHS problems are identified. As noted in section III, there has been a shift
from compliance assistance to enforcement. The Dean Report197 noted this shift and
heard differing views from stakeholders on its merits. Not surprisingly, employers
expressed some concern about the shift and wanted more compliance assistance, while
labour wanted more consistent enforcement in certain areas of non-compliance,
including training and JHSC requirement. The Dean Report recommendation split the
difference, calling for consistent enforcement of serious and wilful contraventions and
compliance assistance where it would help achieve compliance.198
The next section on reactive enforcement returns to consider, in more detail, the
use of Part III prosecutions. For the purposes of the present discussion, it is noteworthy
that such prosecutions almost never result from a proactive inspection. Rather, they are
launched only when a violation has resulted in a serious injury or a fatality.
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Enforcement action taken in response to proactive inspections, therefore, range from
the provision of advice, to formal orders to Part I tickets for which there are set fines,
currently no greater than $295.00.
There is no overriding consensus on the best practice in regard to balancing
between prosecution and compliance beyond the nostrum that neither a pure
compliance nor a pure prosecution model is desirable.199 However, Richard Johnstone
has raised serious questions about the appropriateness of limiting prosecutions to
instances where violations have materialized in substantial harm as these outcomes
may be unrelated to the degree of culpability of the duty holder.200 Rather, a more
appropriate approach to prosecutions would take into account the extent to which the
employer departed from regulatory requirements, the degree of risk posed by the noncompliance and the employer’s track record. Using that metric, a best practice would
result in prosecutions arising from proactive inspections in appropriate circumstances.
With regard to tickets, there have been few empirical studies of their effects, but
a review of those studies and the practice of ticketing (infringement notices) in Australia
supported the view they have a role to play in getting the message across and spurring
preventive OHS activity.201 However, concerns have been raised by Garry Gray about
the way ticketing is used in Ontario, particularly because in his study workers were the
target of 37 percent of the tickets, supervisors 38 percent and employers 25 percent. In
particular, Gray noted that supervisors were far more likely to be charged with failure to
ensure safety than were employers.202 The result is to allow responsibility for
compliance to be pushed down into the lowest reaches of the firm’s managerial
hierarchy rather than treating these violations as failure of the employer’s OHS
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management system that needs to be corrected at a senior management level. The
need for a bottom-up approach, discussed earlier, should be adopted as a best practice
in regard to ticketing.
A fundamental problem facing enforcers of all forms of labour market regulation
is the fissuring of the employment relationship.203 This entails the fragmentation of
previously integrated systems of production, entailing contracting out of work to smaller
firms and the use of contingent workers in the form of temporary employees, temporary
agency workers, and self-employed workers. To the extent that disintegration strategies
still involve having contingent workers perform work on an employer’s site, the employer
retains responsibility for their health and safety and inspectors who visit the site have
the opportunity to observe whether these arrangements are creating observable OHS
risks. They may not, however, be aware that disintegration strategies that may in
themselves undermine good OHS management are being undertaken. For example,
they may not know that some of the workers are employees of the inspected employer
while others are agency workers sent for a temporary work assignment. In that regard,
it is unclear how well the targeting criteria will detect firms where contingent workers are
present onsite. While the MOL does take into account the presence of vulnerable
workers, the term does not seem to be defined and this factor may be offset by an
artificially low claims and cost experience due to the fact that temporary agencies will be
charged for agency workers, and that self-employed workers may not have workers’
compensation coverage or will have coverage in their own names.
The problems for inspection produced by workplace fissuring become even more
difficult when the work is not performed on the employer’s premises but at another site.
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This is because fragmentation and the expansion of supply chains are associated with
an increase in small and medium-sized workplaces. Not only does this create more
workplaces for inspectors to visit, but there is ample evidence that the health and safety
performance of these workplaces is likely to be lower than in larger, more integrated
enterprises and are “relatively impervious to the regular tools of the trade for assessing
risk, providing service and designing interventions.204 Reasons for this include the lower
likelihood that small workplaces will be unionized and provide a channel for worker
voice, and the fact that small business are often lacking in management resources,
knowledge, skill and time. As a result, not only are there more firms to regulate, but
their regulation is more resource intensive. Although the MOL does take into account
firm size as a criterion for targeting proactive inspections, in the absence of a
corresponding growth in inspection resources the likelihood of a firm that fits the
targeting criteria being inspected is likely to decrease. Therefore, a best practice, albeit
one that no jurisdiction has realized, is to link the budget for inspection not only to the
size of the labour force but also to some measure of the level of workplace
fragmentation. Further work would be required to devise such a measure.
Because of the scale of the problem of regulating proliferating and lengthening
supply chains and production networks, researchers have suggested that “upstream”
approaches need to be emphasized, meaning that interventions should be designed to
focus on the contextual and institutional factors that shape risk creation.205 A prominent
example of this approach is supply chain regulation which in various forms seeks to
place responsibility for downstream businesses on the upstream firms that contract with
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them, thereby improving downstream OHS performance and compliance while reducing
the demand downstream for inspection and enforcement resources.
Phil James et al examine several options for supply chain regulation to improve
OHS.206 The report shall return to voluntary approaches later. Here, the focus is
regulatory initiatives. The first approach centres on the use of the government’s
contracting power. The principle is derived from fair wage resolutions, which are also a
common Canadian practice, that require companies doing business with government to
pay wages no less favourable than those provided in prevailing collective agreements.
An analogous mechanism is the federal contractor’s program under the Employment
Equity Act that requires contractors to commit to implement employment equity and to
establish employment equity programs that meet specified requirements and are
subject to compliance reviews. Although these programs are not costless in terms of
monitoring costs, and indeed have been criticized because of the lack of resources
devoted to compliance review,207 they do potentially provide a cost efficient way of
improving labour standards and compliance, especially where the consequence of noncompliance is loss of the ability to contract with the government. This approach could
be adapted to require government contractors to commit to implement specified OHS
management practices and to assume responsibility for the OHS practices of the firms
with whom they may subcontract. An example of this approach is the Construction
(Design and Management) Regulations in the UK. However, to be effective, best
practices would require that adequate resources need to be devoted to compliance.
The second approach aims at the private sector. One example cited by James et
al. that has already been canvassed in the discussion of ES is the “hot cargo” provision
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of the FLSA in the US.208 In principle, the threat that goods that are manufactured in
violation of the OHSA will be prevented from entering into commerce could be used to
leverage agreements from upstream companies to monitor their subcontractors’ OHS
performance and regulatory compliance. Another example provided is from Australia in
relation to long distance truck drivers and fatigue. Not only are employers required to
assess the risk of fatigue and take steps to reduce that risk, but it also extends this
requirement to their contracts with self-employed carriers and imposes an obligation on
freight consignors and consignees to monitor head carriers’ compliance with their legal
obligations and prohibits them from entering into contracts with carriers unless they
have satisfied themselves on reasonable grounds that delivery times and work
arrangements will comply with the driver fatigue management plan.
To this point, it does not appear that Ontario has taken steps to develop any form
supply chain regulation of OHS. This best practice should be a priority.209
(ii) Voice
Unlike ES enforcement, OHS regulation provides institutionalized mechanisms for
employee voice through the requirement for joint health and safety committees (JHSC)
in workplaces with twenty or more workers and for worker health and safety
representatives (HSR) in workplaces where the number of workers regularly exceeds
five. One of the main purposes of JHSCs and HSRs is to identify workplace hazards. A
comprehensive description of the operation and powers of JHSCs, worker JHSC
members and HSRs is beyond the scope of this review. What follows is a basic
overview of the mechanisms for enabling workers’ voices to be part of a proactive
process for managing OHS risks.
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JHSC members and HSRs must receive training, are entitled to obtain
information from the employer, and most importantly here, conduct health and safety
inspections of the workplace no less than once a month. Time spent carrying out these
duties is deemed to be work time for which representatives are to be paid. The
employer must respond to written recommendations within twenty-one days and shall
either provide a timetable for implementing the recommendation or reasons why the
employer does not accept the recommendation. There is no formal dispute resolution
mechanism provided in the act, but if the worker representative believes that the
recommendation is to correct a violation of the act, he or she can complain to the OHSD
and that would trigger a reactive inspection. As well, if a certified member210 believes
that there is a contravention of the act that poses a danger or hazard to a worker and
that a delay in controlling the hazard may seriously impose a danger to a worker, the
member may initiate a procedure leading to a stop work order by the two certified
members. Certified worker members of JHSC do not have the unilateral power to order
that work be stopped, unless the Ontario Labour Relations Board has made an order
permitting it. To our knowledge, no such order has ever been issued.

Worker

representatives also have the power to investigate work refusals and investigate serious
accidents. Finally, a worker JHSC member, HSR or other knowledgeable worker is also
entitled to accompany the inspector.
Workers can also have a direct voice other than through JHSC members or
HSRs. Workers can complain to the OHSD about OHS violations and most workers
can refuse unsafe work where they have reasonable grounds to believe conditions in
the workplace, including the threat of workplace violence, is likely to pose a danger to
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herself or himself, or to another worker. This initiates an internal inspection and if the
worker is not satisfied with the result of that inspection the OHSD inspector is called,
triggering a reactive inspection to determine whether the circumstance that led to the
refusal is likely to harm the worker or another person.
As the above summary indicates, worker voice is institutionalized and enables
workers to be eyes and ears on the shop floor identifying hazards and initiating actions
to have them remedied. International literature confirms that worker participation is a
best practice in OHS regulation.211 However, the literature also emphasizes that it is not
enough to simply mandate worker voice. Rather, the effectiveness of worker voice
varies depending on the presence or absence of a number of supports, including union
representation, legislated support, worker training, active workplace inspectorates and
an activist orientation by worker representatives.212 While Ontario continues to
legislatively support worker voice, most recently evidenced in Bill 160’s addition of a
requirement for HSR training and a power for a single co-chair of a JHSC to make
written recommendations to an employer, the decline in union representation and the
proliferation of small workplaces are undermining the effectiveness of worker voice.213
As a result, worker protagonism is jeopardized, notwithstanding that the OHSA prohibits
retaliation against a worker for exercising her or his rights under the act.
Indeed, the problem of retaliation against workers was raised before the Dean
inquiry. In its report, it called for improved protection from reprisals to encourage
workers to exercise their rights under the act, especially as other measures that it
advocated, such as increasing worker training and awareness, would likely result in
more workers raising OHS concerns.214 Bill 160 responded by enabling inspectors to
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refer a worker reprisal complaint directly to the Ontario Labour Relations Board, which
adjudicates the complaint.
Such measures are helpful, but are unlikely to provide most workers generally
and precarious workers in particular with the security they need to feel comfortable
exercising their OHSA rights. Although there are no panaceas to compensate for
changing structural conditions that undermine worker voice, the Swedish experience
with regional health and safety representatives is a model that could be adopted to
extend the reach of worker voice and increase the surveillance capacity of the
inspectorate to smaller, hard to reach workplaces. Under Swedish law, trade unions
have the right to appoint regional safety representatives for all small firms in which they
have a member and in which there is no JHSC. According to Kaj Frick regional HSRs
“mainly function as peripatetic ‘local’ representatives, who help to detect OHS hazards
and discuss with managers how to abate them.”215 Lacking formal enforcement powers
(except in the face of imminent dangers), their effectiveness in large measure derives
from their superior knowledge and broad experience in addressing OHS issues.
Despite the erosion of the conditions in Sweden that supported the role of regional
health and safety representatives, they still make an important contribution to OHS
management in small firms.
In an environment in which union representation is declining and in which
employer resistance to the presence of outside union-appointed HSRs is likely to be
great, an alternative would be to seek out other intermediaries who are knowledgeable
about health and safety to play this supporting role. Use of community partners might
not be appropriate unless they have the requisite knowledge to be effective advisors
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and monitors. Perhaps a governmental office, similar to the Office of the Worker
Advisor in workers’ compensation might be considered, or non-governmental groups,
like the Workers Health and Safety Legal Clinic or the Occupational Health Clinics for
Ontario Workers could be funded and given a larger mandate to provide these services.
2 Reactive Approaches
Reactive inspection and enforcement occurs when there is a complaint about a
violation, a work refusal or a serious injury or fatality that is required to be reported to
the OHSD. There is no need here to go into the limits of a reactive strategy, except to
reiterate that the willingness to complain or to exercise the right to refuse is shaped by
many factors in addition to the hazards present in the workplace.216 This is especially
true for precarious workers whose vulnerability makes them even less likely to make
formal complaints. Similarly, the occurrence of a serious injury or fatality may or may not
be indicative of a larger problem that requires intervention beyond dealing with the
particular circumstances that caused the mishap. For these reasons, the OHSD has
justifiably put more resources into proactive approaches.
However, when reactive inspections and enforcement actions are taken, it is
important that they are effective and so this issue is critical to address. Examining
reactive inspections in response to work refusals and retaliation complaints revealed
that the mandate of the inspector is to determine whether or not there is a health and
safety violation, not to determine whether a worker has suffered retaliation for enforcing
his or her rights, which is to be determined either through arbitration, where a workplace
is unionized, or through a complaint, and now an inspector referral, to the OLRB. This
arrangement is reasonable. The question addressed here is whether further
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enforcement action should be taken in these circumstances. Here it is also to be noted
that retaliation is also a violation of the OHSA for which an employer could be
prosecuted. However, this is not a practice that has been adopted. The Dean Report
called for a review of the MOL’s policy in this regard and recommended that “enhanced
enforcement” should be undertaken to address egregious or repeated violations of
section 50 (the no-retaliation provision).217 This recommendation should be
implemented. As well, consistent with the previous discussions of a bottom-up
enforcement strategy, a finding that there has been retaliation should trigger a follow up
inspection to insure that senior management has taken appropriate measures to insure
that everyone in the organization understands that workers are not to suffer adverse
consequences for exercising their rights under the act and that measures have been
adopted to avoid a repetition of this unlawful employer behaviour. In the context of
investigations of critical injuries and fatalities, it is notable that Ontario prosecutes
employers far more frequently for OHS offences than do other Canadian jurisdictions.
This is an important component of a best practices enforcement system as numerous
commentators have reiterated that big sticks are needed at the top of an enforcement
pyramid of escalating sanctions to deal with serious and repeat offenders.218 In this
context, further work needs to be done to inquire into why criminal prosecutions have
been used so infrequently and with so little success when they have been tried, for
these should be integrated into and sit at the top of the pyramid of potential sanctions
both for their specific and general deterrent effects, and to emphasize the Rule of Law
principle that mainstream criminal law applies to the wrongdoing in the workplace as
much as it does to wrongdoing in other settings.219
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There is also a question of the use of sanctions other than criminal or Part III
provincial offence prosecutions for contraventions that result in critical injuries or
fatalities. As Gunningham and Johnstone noted for Australia, and is also true of
Ontario, there is a split pyramid of sanctions, where lesser ones are used in the context
of proactive inspections and stronger ones are used in the context of reactive
inspections to critical injuries and fatalities.220 As already suggested, Part III POA
prosecutions ought to be considered in appropriate cases for contraventions detected
during a proactive inspection. The question here is whether other enforcement actions,
either in lieu of or in addition to prosecution should be considered for contraventions
that resulted in a critical injury or death.
Consistent with the position taken previously, that single incidents should trigger
an examination of systemic problems, there is certainly a strong case to be made that
follow up inspections should be conducted in the aftermath of a prosecution to ensure
that specific deterrence has resulted in reform to the employer’s OHS management
system such that the likelihood of future contraventions going undetected and
uncorrected is substantially reduced. Some Australian research has found that many
employers respond to prosecutions in just this way,221 but follow-up inspections would
increase the likelihood of improved OHS performance.
With respect to the use of lesser sanctions in lieu of more serious ones, further
research is required to know more precisely the criteria that are used to determine
whether and when contraventions that result in critical injuries or deaths do not result in
a prosecution. Where they do not, the question arises as to whether there are lesser
sanctions that would be appropriate. Some studies have reported that OHS compliance
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improves after a sanction has been imposed, regardless of its size.222 This might
suggest that a ticket would be effective in this context; however, there is a serious
concern that a ticket would trivialize the seriousness of the consequences and send the
wrong signal. A more promising alternative is the use of enforceable undertakings, a
practice that has been used in Queensland, Australia. Under this provision, a duty
holder who has been charged with an OHS contravention can propose an enforceable
undertaking, which will be accepted in lieu of the prosecution if it delivers benefits
beyond compliance and tangible benefits to workers, the industry or the community.
Undertakings will not be accepted where there has been a fatality or a serious breach of
the Act. Enforceable undertakings include a description of the alleged offence, a
statement of regret, an assurance about future behaviour, a requirement to provide
third-party audit reports on compliance, and a commitment by the duty holder to pay the
regulator’s investigation and monitoring costs. More research is needed to assess the
effectiveness of this enforcement tool and so it is too early to characterize it as a best
practice; early accounts, however, are promising.223
3. Voluntary Approaches
This discussion has already averted to the limits of voluntary compliance
measures, noting that they cannot be a substitute for public enforcement. However, as
in the case of ES, there are private enforcement measures that can play a role in
improving OHS management and performance, provided they are well designed and
linked to public enforcement mechanisms.
Thus far, this report has described OHS management systems on a number of
occasions but has not defined them and so it will be useful to do so here. According to
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Kaj Frick and John Wren, OHS management systems embrace five core principles: 1)
OHS conditions are an aspect of production, therefore; 2) top management is
responsible for OHS conditions; 3) to abate work hazards management must integrate
OHS considerations into all other management decisions; 4) systematic assessment
and evaluation of work hazards is an essential prerequisite to making decisions about
abatement and prevention; and 5) implementation of prevention and abatement requires
tasks and resources to be adequately distributed within the organization.224
Voluntary OHS management systems (OHSM) have their roots in the Safety First
movement that emerged in the early decades of the twentieth century and have been
developed by management consultants and various firms and associations who have
produced and marketed a variety of products such as the Five Star System, the
International Safety Rating System and the DuPont System. As well, many firms have
developed their own internal OHSM systems. These systems are typically highly
specified and often require external private auditing for participating firms to become
certified. Because these systems are proprietary there is little independent research
assessing their effectiveness. Moreover, international private standard-setting
organizations, such as the ISO, have not created an OHSM standard equivalent to the
ISO 14000 standard regarding environmental management.
One common feature of many of these private systems is that they use a
behaviour-based safety model which emphasizes the importance of motivating
employees to follow the employers’ safety rules through a mixture of peer pressure (e.g.
group incentives for consecutive no-lost time accident days), employer monitoring and
discipline. An earlier study of OHSM in Ontario expressed concern about the use of
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such systems to marginalize worker participation and to promote the suppression of
injury reporting and the shortening of recovery time. Moreover, in the absence of
independent assessment, it also rejected the view that firms that voluntarily adopt
privately monitored OHSM systems should be exempt from routine government
inspection.225
Walters et. al.’s recent study of OHSM internationally endorses the view that
voluntary approaches are inadequate to the task and instead its authors advocate
regulated OHSM, in which public inspection plays a critical role.226 This involves, on the
one hand, public standards for OHSM systems and on the other government monitoring
of compliance with those systems. Internationally, a number of jurisdictions have
established OHSM standards, including EU Framework Directive 89/391, which requires
member states to implement principles of OHSM in their domestic OHS laws. In
Ontario, the OHSA provides a basic infrastructure for OHSM, including worker
participation and monthly workplace inspections by worker HSRs and JHSC members.
However, the authors of the study are also wary of making strong claims even for
regulated OHSM systems.227
In short, there is insubstantial evidence that the regulatory project pursued
internationally to improve standards of OHSM has succeeded in significantly changing
the ways in which most duty holders conceive or operationalise these arrangements in
the workplaces for which they are responsible. Nor can it be said that its surveillance by
regulatory inspection has effectively strengthened control over the improvement of the
standards of OHSM. It also therefore remains unproven that the operation of this form
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of regulation has achieved the intended ‘acceptable level’ of protection for workers form
the consequences of workplace risks.
Nevertheless, it has been almost two decades since Ontario last reformed the
IRS provisions of the OHSA, and so it would be timely for a review to be undertaken to
determine whether the legal infrastructure of OHSM complies with current best
practices, especially in the context of the changing world of work and the challenges
they pose for OHSM systems generally and for MOL monitoring of them. As has been
well documented,228 the growth of triangular employment relationships, supply chains
and self-employment are often accompanied by problems of disorganization, including
communication breakdowns, more complicated lines of management control and a
decreased ability on the part of workers to recognize hazards and protect themselves
from them. Moreover, regulatory failure becomes more likely because laws and policies
were often developed with the traditional employment relationship in mind and because
monitoring production networks and chains puts a strain on available resources.
Finally, turning attention back to supply chain regulation, this time focusing on the
role of voluntary codes, there has been a proliferation of voluntary codes relating to the
responsibility of multinationals for the behaviour of their downstream contractors. A
wide range of provisions are made in these codes for monitoring, some of which are
more independent than others. For example, in Australia high profile transnational
corporations involved in textile, clothing and footwear (TCF) production entered into an
enforceable agreement with the union representing TCF workers under which all sites of
production must be disclosed to the union, which is given the contractual authority to
make unannounced inspections.229 As purely voluntary measures, supply chain
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regulation has received mixed reviews. Estlund, (who generally is favourably disposed
toward the development of self-regulatory capacity, also recognizes that the programs
she reviewed all had significant limitations.230 Supply chains must be headed by
publicly visible companies with a significant stake in protecting their brand in order for
them to be vulnerable to public pressure; activists must be able to sustain pressure
indefinitely in order to ensure that voluntary agreements and monitoring arrangements
do not lapse and degrade; resources must be available to support monitoring efforts,
etc. So while some voluntary supply chain schemes are better than others, it would not
be a best practice to give priority to the development of private regulation and private
monitoring. The better approach to supply chain regulation requires that public
regulatory authorities play a central role in establishing the obligations of the upstream
duty holder, supervising the arrangements for monitoring the practices of contractors
and sub-contractors and guaranteeing a role for worker voice in these arrangements. A
number of these efforts were described in the proactive section of OHS best practices
and will not be repeated here.
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VI. Policy Recommendations
This report has mapped and drawn out an analysis of the limitations of current
enforcement practices in ES and OHS. It has observed that where unions are present
in the OHS structures for workers’ voice, the self-regulatory model works better than
when they are lacking. It has reviewed potential reform options based on best practices
in Canadian and other jurisdictions. The report demonstrates that effective enforcement
of labour standards to protect workers in precarious employment and regulate
precarious labour markets will require multi-pronged proactive, reactive, and voluntary
strategies. However, such strategies must be embedded in a strong public/government
enforcement model. This model should be centered on proactive enforcement. Even
though proactive approaches should be prioritized, as they offer the most promise of the
three approaches in upholding the normative principles of providing for decent work,
social minima, universality, and fairness, there is value in certain reactive and voluntary
measures. Reactive enforcement must ensure effective voice and support for workers
to enforce their ES and protection from reprisals. Voluntary strategies that rely on nonstate parties (i.e., employers, employer associations, workers, union and workers
organizations), must ensure meaningful penalties for employers in non-compliance, on
the one hand, and meaningful institutionalized involvement of workers and their
organizations in furthering enforcement effectiveness, on the other hand. Under no
circumstances are purely voluntary approaches recommended; they should only be
used to augment otherwise strong and binding (ideally proactive) approaches.
A number of recommendations for changes in policy and practice flow from the
survey of best practices contained in Section V, considered in light of the deficiencies
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characterizing the current regimes of ES and OHS enforcement in Ontario documented
in preceding sections. The recommendations are divided into these categories of
proactive, reactive, and voluntary approaches, noting the connections between these
proposals and such principles where relevant.

A.

ES Enforcement231

1. Proactive Approaches
(i) Investigations & Inspections
1. Shift model of proactive enforcement to detecting violations and enforcement of
ES for current employees in addition to the current focus of bringing employers
into compliance. Routinely follow-up inspections with audits to ensure social
minima are met through ongoing compliance.
2. Pursue strategic enforcement: Develop enforcement priorities and proactively
target employers in high-violation industries and substandard practices. This
involves mapping labour market practices (i.e., in the interest of the fairness
principle, following up on previous cases of employer violations, new forms of
work organization, sectors and industries comprised of concentrations of young
workers, recent immigrants, women, racialized workers and other indicators of
high rates of employer violations) to develop strategic plans for inspections and
year by year targets. Develop benchmarking to evaluate strategic enforcement.
3. Support expanded investigations: Where an individual claim has confirmed
violations, this should be used to trigger a broader investigation of other
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violations of the employer to protect current employees as is common in other
jurisdictions. This recommendation too is consistent with the goal of fairness.
4. Pursue multi-agency investigations of employers and targeted sectors or
practices: Initiate multi-agency investigations, possibly beginning with the
introduction of a pilot project in which OHS and ES inspectorates engage in joint
initiatives. Through such investigations, target practices such as
misclassification of employees as ‘independent contractors’ and sub-contracting
(in this process, a reverse onus in which a worker is presumed to be an
employee unless the employer can provide proof to the contrary should be
pursued). Such measures elevate the principles of both universality – that is,
extending existing protections to the greatest number of workers – and fairness
given the need to safeguard misclassified workers.
5. Introduce state-supported up the chain inspections and investigations: The MOL
should consider making agreements with large firms engaging subcontractors
that make them responsible for their subcontractors at lower levels of the chain,
through the introduction of a regime of inspection supervised by the Ministry or a
joint taskforce involving workers and their advocates, and simultaneously
strengthen provisions for joint and several liability in the ESA.232 Here again,
fairness, universality and providing for social minima for all workers in the chain
of production are key objects.
6. Introduce a ‘positive duty’ for employers to prevent violations of the ESA.233 This
recommendation is directed at achieving all four principles but elevates fairness
in particular.
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7. Enact a “hot cargo” provision to the ESA that would enable inspectors to impose
an embargo on goods manufactured in violation of Act to ensure that, in fairness,
penalties are felt by all parties to the chain of production.234
(ii) Penalties & Settlements
8. Create an effective presumption of employer retaliation: In the interest of
fairness, universality and establishing social minima, prevent employer retaliation
by protecting workers who assert their rights by establishing a set fine for
confirmed reprisals and providing interim reinstatement during claims
investigation for workers that have been fired for seeking entitlements (i.e.,
establish a fast-track process for reinstatement and, in cases where
reinstatement is not feasible, fast-track compensation of workers who have been
penalized for attempting to enforce their rights, including all lost wages and costs
of employer retaliation).235
9. Shift the costs of ES enforcement on those that violate the ESA: Consistent with
the notion of fairness, make employers pay the administrative costs of inspecting
violations and enforcing ES where they are found in violation of the ESA.236
10. Establish set fines (rather than giving ESO discretion) for confirmed violations
(even in settlement): The current use of Part I tickets ($360 or less) does not
provide adequate incentives to comply with the law. Rather, in pursuit of just
social minima and fairness, fines doubling or tripling the amount owed, such as
provided for in the New York State Wage Theft Protection Act, would provide a
better incentive. Further, workers should receive interest on all unpaid wages
owing.237
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11. Simplify and improve the transparency of prosecution policy: Each and every
repeat violation or non-payment of orders should be prosecuted under Part III
Provincial Offences so that employers are fined and ordered to pay unpaid
wages in line with the notion of universality.
(iii) Voice
12. Encourage partnerships between the MOL and Community organizations to
improve enforcement: The MOL should work with workers’ advocates and
community organizations working directly with precariously employed workers to
target companies and industries where wages go unpaid in order to promote both
fairness and decent work. These organizations are most grounded in the
experience of the workers in concern and thus it is only just to involve them in the
administrative process as elsewhere.
13. Promote greater worker control over the labour standards through improved
access to unionization and other workplace regulations fostering labour market
security. The decline in union density, particularly in the private sector, coupled
with the growth of precarious employment creates substantial challenges to
workers voice and enforcing a floor of minimum standards. There is a need to not
only redress continued de-collectivization and/or stagnation of labour relations in
Ontario but to reverse this trend. In addition, introduce mechanisms of broaderbased bargaining for self-employed and other workers in precarious paid
employment who face challenges to unionizing and/or, at a minimum, to
benefiting from collectively agreed social minima (see also Vosko and Noack, in
this LCO working paper series).238
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2.

Reactive Approaches

(i) Inspections & Investigations
14. Allow for third-party and anonymous complaints to initiate inspections in order to
minimize threats to workers whose rights are being violated. Implementing this
recommendation would mean that the most precariously employed workers,
facing heightened threats of reprisal, are not obliged to take on their employers in
fairness to their situation and the goal of securing social minima.
15. Streamline the complaints process and reduce the complaints backlog by
providing, as a first step in the claims process, person-to-person assistance to
workers to prepare their claim so that investigators can expeditiously adjudicate
the matter. Administratively, this proposal, if implemented, would both deliver a
fairer process for all workers to secure minimum protections, including those
lacking access to the internet and/or the language proficiency to make claims
and assist investigators in doing their jobs.
(ii) Penalties & Settlements
16. Update time limitations and monetary caps to reduce barriers to employment
standards remedies: The increase in minimum wage and barriers to enforcing
employment standards leaves many workers owed substantially more than the
$10,000 cap on monies recoverable under the ESA. For this reason, in the
interest of fairness and to ensure that social minima are up to date (i.e., reflect
labour market realities), the Act’s limitation periods and amount of wages
recoverable should be brought in line with Ontario’s small claims court.
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Specifically, the monetary limit on monies that can be recovered should be
changed to $25,000 and the ESA time limit should be extended to 2 years to
recover wages and entitlements.239
(iii) Voice
17. Worker Representation in the claims-making process: To ensure that all workers
have access to the claims process (i.e., universality) and in fairness, allow
representation and provide funding for workers to have representation in
reporting violations and the claims process as a whole.

3. Voluntary Approaches
18. Purely voluntary approaches to ES regulation and management are not
recommended.
(i) Investigations & Inspections
19. Encourage the creation of a public procurement policy: The government of
Ontario should require that its contractors adhere to not only minimum ES but
industry norms so that the floor of social minima is elevated. In its aim of
improving social minima consistent with the costs of living in Ontario, this
recommendation is consistent with the call for raising the wage levels, and
augmenting the wage package, contained in another LCO report (Vosko and
Noack, in this series), although it asks the government to take on a leadership
role as a model employer.240
20. Support partnerships between state agencies and worker organizations in
improving enforcement: The review of best practices illustrates the merits of
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creating initiatives aimed at enforcing labour standards where organizations of
workers assist government agencies, including labour inspectorates, with
spotting and documenting violations as well as assisting workers in making
claims. Such partnerships should be cultivated to ensure decent work for all.

B.

OHS Enforcement

1. Proactive Approaches
1. Employ risk-based regulation: Use of risk-based regulation, which includes an
assessment the OHS risks posed by an activity or by particular firms engaged in
that activity based on their competence and commitment to control and manage
those risks and is thus sensitive to ensuring that social minima and decent
conditions of health and safety at work apply to all workers. In pursuit of this
approach to regulation, develop leading rather than lagging indicators for the
purposes of making such assessments (as recommended by the Dean Report).
(i) Investigations & Inspections
2. Engage in safety blitzes: Safety blitzes based on appropriate risk assessments,
which aim to ensure the principle of universality in that all workers are protected
regardless of the industry in which they are located, should continue.
3. Enforce OHS from the bottom-up: Use of a “bottom-up” approach in enforcement,
which requires that when officials detect a violation - whether in the context of a
proactive or a reactive inspection - they should not treat it as a discrete event;
rather, in fairness to all workers with a given firm, the violation should trigger a
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broader review of the employer’s OHS management system to determine why
the violation occurred and was not detected and corrected by management.
4. Prosecute before harm is done: To ensure social minima are in place, consider
the use of Part III prosecutions as the result of proactive inspections that find
significant departures from regulatory requirements notwithstanding that no harm
has yet materialized.
5. Avoid downward levelling through the use of tickets: Uphold decent conditions of
work and social minima by using tickets appropriately; that is, tickets should be
used, but not in a manner that allows responsibility for OHS to be pushed
downwards. A bottom-up approach (as above) requires that ticketed violations
should be treated as a failure of the employer’s OHS management system that
needs to be addressed at senior levels.
6. Employ strategic enforcement practices in OHS enforcement: To ensure a fair
and consistent approach to regulation, develop criteria for identifying sectors and
firms in which employment fissuring has occurred so that they can be better
targeted for proactive inspection.
7. Sync budgets for inspections to the size of the labour force and the degree of
fissuring in workplaces: In the interest of fairness, linking the budget for
inspection both to the size of the labour force and to the degree of workplace
fissuring is necessary because of the greater demand that it places on inspection
resources.
8. Develop supply chain regulation: To ensure universal treatment of all workers in
a given chain of production, develop upstream approaches to supply chain
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regulation that increase the responsibility at the top end of the chain for OHS
performance at the lower levels.241
9. Improve procurement policies: Government contracts, as model contracts, should
require contractors to commit to specified OHS management practices, which
include monitoring OHS performance by sub-contractors. Government must
monitor this dimension of contract compliance in the interest of supporting social
minima.
10. Enact a “hot cargo” provision to OHSA that would enable inspectors to impose an
embargo on goods manufactured in violation of Act to ensure that social minima
are respected and that all parties to production are penalized in a universal
fashion.242
11. Monitor OHS performance by sub-contractors: Impose an obligation on private
sector employers to monitor OHS performance by sub-contractors and to
exercise due diligence to ensure that contract terms do not create undue
pressure on contractors to engage in unsafe practices. Joint liability for
downstream violations should be considered to ensure that all parties are treated
fairly and subjected to the same requirements for providing for social minima for
all workers in the chain of production.243
(ii) Voice
12. Create an institution of regional health and safety representatives: The decline in
private sector union density creates a challenge for effective worker voice, a
critical vehicle for securing fairness at work as well as social minima and decent
terms and conditions, as does the growth of precarious employment. The
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creation of a functional equivalent to the Swedish institution of regional health
and safety representatives should be considered, including the creation of the
equivalent of an Office of the Worker Advisor or an expanded mandate for nongovernmental groups like the Workers’ Health and Safety Legal Clinic or the
Occupational Health Clinics for Ontario Workers.244
2. Reactive Approaches
(i) Investigations & Inspections
13. Retaliatory behaviour should be penalized appropriately: In recognition of the
unequal relationship between workers and employers, and in fairness to workers
who pursue complaints about their employers despite this power imbalance, in
the context of inspections triggered by a complaint that a worker has experienced
retaliation for exercising her rights under the Act, inspectors should consider
recommending Part III prosecutions for violations of the Act when appropriate
(See Dean Report).
14. Mandate follow-up inspections in cases of employer retaliation: Consistent with
the bottom-up approach which aims to ensure that social minima extend to all
workers, where there has been a finding that retaliation has occurred, this should
trigger a follow-up inspection to determination whether the employer’s OHS
management system has been reformed to insure that workers’ OHS rights are
now better protected.
15. Inquire into the limited use of criminal prosecutions: OHS regulation is about
protecting workers from bodily harm. In the interest of universality through safety
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for all workers, investigate why criminal prosecutions have not been better
integrated into the pyramid of enforcement.
16. Mandate follow-up inspections in cases of prosecutions under the OHSA or the
Criminal Code: To promote decent work by ensuring that all workers are safe in
the workplaces of known violators, follow-up inspections should occur after a
successful prosecution under the Criminal Code or the OHSA to insure that the
employer has responded by correcting the deficiencies in its OHS management
system.
17. Consider introducing enforceable undertakings: Investigate the use of
enforceable undertakings where OHS contraventions occurred but for which a
prosecution is not required so that the social minima for all workers in the
workplaces in question are protected.245
3. Voluntary Approaches
18. Purely voluntary approaches to OHS regulation and management are not
recommended.
19. Review current regulation of OHS management systems in Ontario, taking into
account the changing world of work and the challenges this poses to OHS
management and to the regulation of OHS management in fairness to workers
and to ensure that these systems keep a pace with workplace realities.
20. Employ the selective and strategic use of voluntary codes of conduct to
supplement, but not replace, public regulations: In the context of supply chains,
voluntary codes of conduct may provide some amelioration under certain
conditions, but the preferable and fairest approach is for public regulatory

!

$$$

authorities to play a central role in imposing obligations on upstream duty
holders, including the arrangements for monitoring downstream compliance, and
in guaranteeing a role for worker voice.
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